China\u27s Orphan Welfare System: Laws, Policies And Filled Gaps by High, Anna Jane
126 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 8 
!
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
!
 
 
[This Page Intentionally Left Blank.] 
!
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China’s Orphan Welfare System: 
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This article presents a socio-legal analysis of the care of orphaned and 
other vulnerable children in China, reviewing law, policy and practice 
relating to state and non-state orphanages and foster homes. The 
analysis is first contextualized by an introduction to the demographics 
of children cared for in state and non-state welfare institutions; 
prevailing social and cultural attitudes to their rights and entitlements; 
and the complex nexus between the politically high-stake issue of birth 
planning and the arguably consequent vulnerability of such children. 
The article then introduces formal laws and policies relating to the care 
of orphans, including government duties and responsibilities towards 
this vulnerable population. The findings of empirical fieldwork carried 
out in China examining the role of “non-legal,” unregistered and 
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unrecognized non-state actors/NGOs in filling gaps left by the formal 
state orphan welfare system are then presented. Although the Chinese 
government claims to take responsibility for orphans, and ostensibly 
monopolizes the running of orphanages, it is failing to recognize, 
regulate or oversee the prolific number of private orphanages that have 
emerged in the last three decades in response to perceived gaps in 
state-provided services. The emergence of unregulated non-state 
orphanages, and the gap between child welfare laws and policies, on 
the one hand, and practice on the other, has resulted in lines of 
stratification being drawn among Chinese orphans in terms of their 
access to care and adoption prospects. The implementation of clearer 
policies, and improved access to formalized state support for the 
currently informal non-state sector, are needed to promote better 
outcomes for vulnerable children and caregivers alike, as well as to 
better guard against sub-standard practices and neglect of orphans. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
My name is Rose, I am from Hubei* and I am 18 years old. I lived 
in a village with my parents and older sister. We were very happy 
2013]  CHINA’S ORPHAN WELFARE SYSTEM  129 
 
 
children. Our parents cared for us. But one day, when I was four 
years old, my older sister accidentally poured boiling water over my 
head. I was in so much pain. Baba [my father] took me to the 
doctor, who said to put toothpaste over the burns. My sister helped 
me apply the toothpaste, but it only helped a little. I had terrible 
wounds. Baba was so angry with my sister that he beat her. Not 
only was I scarred, but my family was too poor to send me to 
school. So one day Baba brought me to the door of the local 
orphanage. A kind ayi [aunt] took me in, and I started my life there. 
My ayi was really very kind to me. The other children were also 
good. But they could be so strong-willed and sometimes rough, 
sometimes bossy. We often had our differences. My scalp was 
burned, and it left such a scar emotionally. I didn’t like to talk. 
From the time I arrived, I stopped talking much. The children 
started bullying me. The ayis were really kind to me, so the other 
kids bullied me. My life there was the same every day. After each 
meal, we played ballgames together – but I was just no good at 
these, and they started excluding me. I started playing on my own. I 
would watch the workers in the vegetable garden. I would spend 
time on the roof. It was so high. I was scared. Every day, my life 
was like this.1 
 
I met Rose2 in 2010 in her home near Beijing. She lived in a private foster 
home run by an American couple, which cares for children with special medical 
needs coming from state-run orphanages. She is one of many children who have 
been fostered from state orphanages across China, or abandoned directly, into the 
informal care and guardianship of privately run orphanages and foster homes. 
These homes are, for the most part, unregistered, and are not recognized by formal 
law or policy. Rose’s life story, including her disfigurement and subsequent 
abandonment, her childhood spent in a state orphanage, and her move as a 
teenager to a privately-run home, is emblematic of the complex intersection of 
social, cultural, and political factors pertaining to current laws and policies on the 
care of orphans in China. This article undertakes a socio-legal analysis of the care 
of orphaned and other vulnerable children in China by reviewing law, policy, and 
practice relating to state and non-state orphanages and foster homes. 
The analysis begins with an introduction of the demographics of children 
cared for in state and non-state welfare institutions, prevailing social and cultural 
                                                      
1 Testimony of a resident at Compassion Family Life House. 
2 Where referenced herein, people, organizations and place names are referred to by 
pseudonyms to preserve anonymity. 
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discourse and attitudes associated with abandonment and relating to the rights and 
entitlements of abandoned children, and the complex association between the 
politically high-stake issue of birth planning and the arguably consequent 
vulnerability of such children. The article then introduces the formal laws and 
policies relevant to the care of orphans, including government duties and 
responsibilities towards this population, before presenting the findings of 
empirical fieldwork carried out in China examining the role of “non-legal,” 
unregistered, and unrecognized non-state actors or non-government organizations 
(NGOs) in filling gaps left by the formal state orphan welfare system. I find that 
although the Chinese government claims to take responsibility for orphans, and 
ostensibly monopolizes the operation of welfare institutions, it is failing to 
recognize, regulate or oversee the prolific number of private orphanages and foster 
homes that have emerged in the last three decades in response to perceived gaps in 
state-provided services. The emergence of such homes and the gap between child 
welfare laws and policies on the one hand, and practice on the other, has resulted 
in lines of stratification being drawn among Chinese orphans in terms of their 
access to care and adoption prospects. The implementation of clearer policies, and 
improved access to formalized state support for the currently informal non-state 
sector, are needed to promote better outcomes for vulnerable children and 
caregivers alike. 
This Article is the culmination of numerous trips to various foster homes 
and orphanages in China, carried out between 2005 and 2010. The subjects of this 
study were approached based on personal introductions and chain-referral 
sampling. This led to contacts with both state and non-state Chinese-run 
orphanages. This Article is primarily based on interviews conducted between July 
and October 2009 and between July and September 2010. Interviews were 
conducted with representatives of twenty-seven state and private orphanages and 
foster homes located in Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, and 
Jiangsu provinces, and the Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai municipalities. In 
addition, interviews were conducted with a number of child-related NGOs, both 
foreign and Chinese, and a number of government and government-owned 
departments and entities.3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
3 Ministry of Civil Affairs China Charity and Donation Information Centre; Shandong 
Charity Federation Office; Ministry of Civil Affairs NGO Service Centre. 
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II. DEMOGRAPHICS OF VULNERABILITY 
Dr. Xiaoyuan Shang, the leading Chinese researcher on vulnerable 
children in China, categorizes children requiring welfare into three groups: 
orphaned or abandoned children, children of prisoners, and street children.4 This 
study focuses on the provision of welfare services to the former two groups; the 
third group, which at times overlaps with the other two, includes victims of 
kidnapping and child trafficking.5 Most orphaned and abandoned children live in 
rural areas and many are also disabled.6 The term “orphan” is used loosely herein 
and by Shang to refer to children who are no longer cared for by their parents. 
Researchers believe the majority of children living in state and private orphanages 
do, in fact, have one or both parents living, but have been abandoned for reasons 
explored further below. 7  The Chinese term for orphan, gu’er—gu meaning 
“solitary,” “isolated,” or “alone,” and er meaning “child”—accommodates these 
various life circumstances more than the English translation. 
According to the most recent government study on vulnerable children in 
China, carried out by Shang and commissioned by the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MCA), as of April 2005 there were 573,371 orphaned children in China,8 
although the number may be underreported.9 The study ambiguously defines 
                                                      
4 Xiaoyuan Shang et al., Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children: The Missing Role of 
the State, 181 CHINA Q. 122, 124-25 (2005) [hereinafter Shang et al., Welfare Provision]. 
5 Id. at 125. 
6 Id. at 124. 
7 Id. at 124 (noting that 95% of children in Chinese government care are abandoned); see 
generally CORRINA CSAKY, SAVE THE CHILDREN, KEEPING CHILDREN OUT OF HARMFUL 
INSTITUTIONS: WHY WE SHOULD BE INVESTING IN FAMILY-BASED CARE 1 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Keeping_Children_Out_of_Har
mful_Institutions_Final_20.11.09_1.pdf (noting that this is a feature of orphanages 
generally). 
8 XIAOYUAN SHANG, ZHONGGUO GUER ZHUANGKUANG YANJIU ( (GLP) 
[SURVIVAL CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE CONDITION OF ORPHANS IN CHINA] 10 (2008) 
[hereinafter SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN]. 
9 The total number of orphans may be under-reported by the study because many orphaned 
and abandoned children, including those living in many of the private orphanages 
interviewed, do not possess hukou [residency permits] and, thus, are unlikely to be 
included in official statistics. See Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 129 n.28 
(noting that the children in unregistered private orphanages “have no legal status”). Hukou 
refers to an individual’s residency permit under the Chinese Household Registration 
System. It primarily functions as a type of internal passport system: residents of China who 
are not registered under the hukou system do not possess legal personality and face grave 
(continued next page) 
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orphans as young people who have lost their parents—it is unclear if this would 
include, for example, children whose guardians are in prison, or children who have 
been abandoned. The Joint Ministerial Opinion on Strengthening Orphan Relief 
puts the figure at 573,000, using the same definition.10 Of these, around 66,000 are 
in the care of state welfare institutes, and 295,000 receive “state institutional aid” 
of some kind,11 which means that approximately one third of China’s reported 
orphan population does not receive institutional aid relief, and less than twelve 
percent reside in state facilities, not all of which are exclusively for children.12 
More than eighty-six percent of the reported orphan population is registered as 
rural householders.13 Less than 0.1% are residents of the three model urban 
orphanage centers of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin.14 
In addition, there are a large number of children whose primary caregivers 
are serving long-term or life sentences. Due to discrimination experienced by 
children of prisoners in society and the consequent dearth of community-based 
                                                                                                                                        
difficulties in obtaining access to civic entitlements such as health care, education and 
employment. Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of 
China’s Hukou System, 139 CHINA Q. 644, 644 (1994) (noting that hukou registration 
provides the “principal basis for establishing identity, citizenship and proof of official 
status,” and is required to establish eligibility for social welfare, employment, education 
and marriage). 
10  MINZHENGBU (E8Z ) [MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS], GUANYU JIAQIANG GU’ER 
JIUZHU GONGZUO DE YIJIAN (1(9-J2V ) [JOINT MINISTERIAL 
OPINION ON STRENGTHENING ORPHAN RELIEF] (2006), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-04/14/content_254233.htm [hereinafter STRENGTHENING 
ORPHAN RELIEF]. 
11 SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 10, 26 (reporting that of the orphans 
receiving state institutional aid, 53,073 receive city-level government support, 124,546 are 
supported through the nongcun wubao system, and 115,637 by the rural poverty household 
aid scheme). Nongcun wubao (literally, “Rural Five Guarantees”) is “a [rural] community-
based welfare system that provides the five guarantees of free food, clothes, fuel, health 
services, and education or funeral arrangements as appropriate for the elderly, sick and 
disabled as well as for orphans who are not only unable to look after themselves but also 
have no one legally responsible for their welfare.” Xiaoyuan Shang, Looking for a Better 
Way to Care for Children: Cooperation between the State and Civil Society in China, 76 
SOC. SERV. REV. 203, 206 (2002) [hereinafter Shang, Better Way]; see also CHAK KWAN 
CHAN ET AL., SOCIAL POLICY IN CHINA: DEVELOPMENT AND WELL-BEING 71-85 (2008) 
(outlining the development of the nongcun wubao program); LINDA WONG, 
MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN CHINA 132 (1998) (“By 1958 . . . [i]ndigent 
and unattached persons could get help through the ‘five guarantees’ and communal relief 
schemes.”). 
12 SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 10, 26-27 (2008). 
13 Id. at 10. 
14 Id. 
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care and assistance, such children may face a greater risk of neglect than 
orphans.15 Beijing Star Village is a non-government home that cares for such 
children, and Madam Leng, its founder and director, has opened other homes 
across six provinces that have this mission. She states that “[o]n their own, the 
children would be left without shelter . . . . They suffer like orphans, but are 
unqualified to be taken in by a charity,” and estimates that there are several 
hundred thousand children in similar situations across China, although many of 
these are cared for by extended family or neighbors.16 
III. ABANDONMENT IN CHINA: DISCOURSE AND ATTITUDES 
A. Abandonment as a Crime 
Several Chinese statutes list abandonment as a crime, including the 
Marriage Law, 17  the Adoption Law, 18  the Protection of Minors Law, 19  the 
                                                      
15 Interviews with Madam Leng, Director, Star Village, in Beijing (Aug. 20, 2009 and 
Aug. 9, 2010); see also Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 127 (“[T]he 
children of long-term prisoners are not entitled to any state welfare provision.”). 
16 Interviews with Madam Leng, Director, Star Village, supra note 15. 
17 Hunyin Fa (%$F) [Marriage Law], art. 3 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981, amended Apr. 28, 2001) 2001 
China Law LEXIS 2155 (“Maltreatment and desertion of one family member by another 
shall be prohibited.”); see also id. art. 21 (“Infanticide by drowning, abandonment of 
infants and all other acts causing serious harm to infants shall be prohibited.”); id. art. 45 
(“The person who commits . . . maltreatment or abandonment of a family member, if it 
constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the 
law.”). Other articles specify that in the case of an underage child whose parents are 
deceased or unable to care for them, the grandparents or siblings are obligated to bring up 
the child. Id. arts. 28-29. 
18 Shouyang Fa (7F) [Adoption Law], art. 31 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1991, amended Nov. 4, 1988) 1998 China Law LEXIS 990 
(“Whoever abandons an infant shall be fined by a public security organ; if the act 
constitutes a crime, the offender shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in 
accordance with law.”). 
19 Weicheng Nianren Baohu Fa (>3.
4F) [Law on the Protection of Minors], art. 
10 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Of the People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1991, revised 
Dec. 29, 2006, effective June 1, 2007) 2006 China Law LEXIS 9895 (“It is prohibited to 
commit family violence against minors, or to maltreat or forsake minors. Infanticide and 
other acts of cruelly killing infants shall be prohibited. No one may discriminate against 
female or handicapped minors.”). 
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Protection of the Disabled Law,20 and the Law Protecting the Rights and Interests 
of Women and Children.21 However, prosecution for abandonment under such 
laws is, in general, rare because of the lack of adequate enforcement 
mechanisms.22 Further, sanctions, when imposed, are normally lenient, which 
arguably renders the legislation largely ineffective.23 Similarly, Johnson’s study 
found that “most people who abandoned children were not punished, even though 
most were unable to keep the act a secret,” and punishments, when imposed, 
consisted of fines, sometimes coupled with sterilization for the birth mother.24 
Punishments were almost always administered by birth planning authorities, rather 
than judicial institutions: “What has been at stake in the government’s concern 
over abandonment is not protecting the interests or legal rights of the children 
involved but maintaining a firm grip on birth planning and population control.”25 
However, several Chinese interviewees told me that one reason babies are 
commonly abandoned at private orphanages rather than state facilities is out of 
fear on the part of the abandoning parent of incurring state sanctions. Thus, while 
criminalization is not necessarily a sufficiently strong deterrent to prevent 
abandonment, it seems to be contributing to the abandonment of children into the 
care of non-state orphanages. 
                                                      
20 Canjiren Baozhang Fa (CI
[F) [Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons], 
art. 9 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, effective 
May 15, 1991) 1990-1992 FALÜ QUANSHU 1268 (China), translated in 14 P.R.C. LAWS & 
REGS V-03-00-101 (“[M]altreatment and abandoning of disabled persons shall be 
prohibited.”). 
21 Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa (#"@K[F) [Law on the Protection of Rights and 
Interests of Women], art. 38 (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, 
revised Aug. 28, 2005) 1992 China Law LEXIS 455 (“Women’s right of life and health 
shall be inviolable. It shall be prohibited to drown, abandon or cruelly injure or kill female 
babies.”). 
22 Kay Johnson et al., Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China, 24 POPULATION & DEV. 
REV. 469, 479 (1998) (“Most commentators agree that there have been few prosecutions 
for the escalating crime of abandonment.”); see also Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: 
Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s Family-
Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 169 (1996) (noting that “legal 
instruments have rarely been utilized to render punishment or remedies” for violations of 
the rights and interests of children). 
23 Haiyan Li et al., Beijingshi Gucan Ertong Bei Yiqide Yuanyin Fenxi ((	,
/2)') [An Analysis of Reasons Behind the Abandonment of Orphans and 
Disabled Children in Beijing], 4(1) BEIJING SHEHUI KEXUE (	MO)) [BEIJING 
SOC. SCI.] 82, 87 (2004).  
24 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 479-480. 
25 Id. at 480. 
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B. Demographics of Abandonment 
I have seen a lot of fathers and mothers come not for 
rehabilitation, but just to know where to leave their children. I am 
frequently able to convince them that it is not a good idea, but it is 
quite a common idea. They say, “Oh but it’s better the child is 
taken in by a sister, because they know what to do, I don’t know 
what to do with him”. But he is your child!26 
 
This baby girl was born on – 1992 at 5:30 A.M. and is now 100 
days old . . . . She is in good health and has never suffered any 
illness. Because of the current political situation and heavy 
pressures that are too difficult to explain, we, who were her 
parents for these first days, cannot continue taking care of her. We 
can only hope that in this world there is a kind-hearted person 
who will care for her. Thank you. In regret and shame, your father 
and mother.27 
 
Statistics on the rate of abandonment in China are scarce. There is 
arguably a connection between birth control policies and abandonment rates,28 a 
connection that has, in some areas, been expressly acknowledged within the 
MCA.29 For example, Kay Johnson reports that an investigative report of the 
                                                      
26 Carlotta, an Italian nurse who works with Catholic private orphanages to improve 
medical standards, speaking with amazement of the numbers of Chinese parents bringing 
their disabled children to the Catholic rehabilitation center. Interview with Carlotta, nurse, 
in Guanghui, Hebei (Jul. 10, 2010). 
27  Note accompanying an infant abandoned in Hunan province, reproduced in KAY 
JOHNSON, WANTING A DAUGHTER, NEEDING A SON: ABANDONMENT, ADOPTION, AND 
ORPHANAGE CARE IN CHINA 75 (2004). 
28 Id. at 50 (referring to abandoned infant girls as “victims of [birth-planning] policies”); 
see also Kay Johnson, The Politics of the Revival of Infant Abandonment in China, with 
Special Reference to Hunan, 22 POPULATION & DEV. R. 77, 78 (1996) (discussing 
provincial statistics indicating a nexus between birth control policies and abandonment); 
Ming Tsui & Lynne Rich, The Only Child and Educational Opportunity for Girls in Urban 
China, 16 GENDER & SOC. 74, 74 (2002) (noting the abandonment of baby girls as a 
negative consequence of China’s one-child policy). C.f. Therese Hesketh and Wei Xing 
Zhu, Health in China: The One Child Family Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 
314 BRIT. MED. J. 1685, 1687 (1997) (arguing that abandonment is not attributable to birth 
planning policies, as it was “common long before the one child policy”). 
29  The central MCA is the administrative authority responsible for social and 
administrative affairs, including welfare programs for marginal groups.  MCA bureaus at 
(continued next page) 
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Hunan MCA “makes explicit the connection between abandonment and birth-
planning campaigns [and] even regards the province’s welfare centers as 
barometers of birth-planning work in particular areas: when birth-planning work is 
“‘grasped tightly,’ more foundlings are received in local welfare facilities.”30 As 
such, local and central “birth-planning officials have compelling reasons to 
obscure the problem [of abandonment].”31 For example, “[d]rawing attention to 
abandonment is seen as an implicit criticism of birth-planning policies, and birth-
planning officials complain that such efforts make their work more difficult.”32 
The incidence of abandonment is further obscured by informal adoptions, which 
mean that many abandoned children are unaccounted for in official statistics and 
estimates of orphan numbers.33 
Julie Jimmerson cites a Chinese study conducted in Guangdong province, 
which estimates that infant abandonment for the entire province was 
approximately 10,000 per year between 1987 and 1989.34 Ninety percent of those 
abandoned infants were female, and 22.6% were disabled or deformed.35 Johnson 
notes a commonly cited figure of 160,000 abandoned children nation-wide,36 but 
concedes that “‘hard data’ concerning abandonment are extremely difficult to 
obtain”. 37  A more recent study claims that more than 10,000 children are 
abandoned annually in China.38 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child’s most recent report on China expresses concern about “the significant 
number of children abandoned on the mainland and the large number of children 
living in institutions,” and the “lack of precise statistical data” relating to this 
population.39 
                                                                                                                                        
both provincial and local level complement it. See generally MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS, 
http://mca.gov.cn. 
30 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 57. 
31 Id. at 50. 
32 Id. at 66. 
33 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 502 (“[T]o a significant though unknown extent, 
adoptive parents have emerged spontaneously to handle the crisis of abandonment created 
by population control policies, many of them defying government adoption law and policy 
to do so.”). 
34 Julie Jimmerson, Female Infanticide in China: An Examination of Cultural and Legal 
Norms, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 47, 73 (1990). 
35 Id. 
36 Johnson, supra note 28, at 91. 
37 Id. at 77. 
38 Xiaoyuan Shang et al., Discrimination Against Children with Disability in China, 20 
INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 298, 299 (2011). 
39 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on its 40th Sess., Sept. 19-Sept. 20, 2005, U.N. 
Doc. No. CRC/C/CHN/CO/2 (Nov. 24, 2005). 
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Rose’s life story bears witness to the confluence of disadvantages and 
socio-economic factors that underlie the problem of abandonment in China today, 
including gender, disability, and poverty.40 The issue of infant abandonment in 
China, and more particularly the impact of birth control policies and cultural 
constructions of gender on the demographics of de facto “orphans,” has received 
much scholarly and media attention, with the most comprehensive study being that 
of Johnson, Huang Banghan and Wang Liyao. In Infant Abandonment and 
Adoption in China, Johnson and her colleagues present the results of a 1995–96 
study of 392 families who had adopted children and 237 families who had 
abandoned children.41 The study introduces China’s long history of infanticide and 
abandonment of female children,42 including how, despite improved rural living 
standards since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, “birth planning efforts in the 
1980s appeared to revive the twin problems of infanticide and abandonment, 
particularly the latter.”43 Johnson found that gender, birth order, and the gender 
composition of siblings were the most important determinants of who was 
abandoned.44 The vast majority of the cases of abandoning families were from 
agricultural—as opposed to urban—hukou families,45 but they did not find a 
relationship between abandonment and relative impoverishment. 
Other studies note the high incidence of disability among children who are 
residents of state orphanages: for example, Shang, Wu and Li’s 2005 study puts 
the figure at 80.5%.46 However, it may be that “disability” is at times defined 
                                                      
40 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, DEATH BY DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN 
CHINA’S STATE ORPHANAGES 14 (1996) (“Rural poverty, prejudice against the disabled, 
traditional attitudes towards female children, and the pressures generated by the country’s 
stringent population policy all contribute to the problem [of abandonment].”); see also 
Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 208 (discussing discrimination against women, rural 
poverty, social changes and family planning policies as factors behind abandonment in 
China). 
41 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 483, 479. 
42 See also Li et al., supra note 23, at 85; Jimmerson, supra note 34, at 66 (providing 
statistics suggesting a disproportionate abandonment or infanticide of female babies). The 
phenomenon is not, of course, uniquely Chinese. 
43 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 472 (stating that this may be the result of the strict 
penalties for over-quota births, combined with culturally and economically motivated 
preferences for healthy, male children). 
44 Id. at 475. 
45 For a description of the hukou, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
46 Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaoming Wu & Haiyan Li, Shehui Zhengce, Shehui Xinbie yu 
Zhongguo de Ertong Yiqi Wenti (*%-*!)	,234) [Social 
Policy, Social Gender and the Problem of Infant Abandonment in China], 4 YOUTH 
STUDIES 1, 1 (2005). 
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broadly by orphanage and government officials to include, for example, relatively 
minor conditions such as cleft lips or birthmarks.47 Johnson notes that the Chinese 
government, “defensive after attacks by Western human rights groups, often refers 
only to ‘abandoned disabled children and orphans’ when discussing its orphanage 
population, implying that healthy children are not abandoned in China today.”48 
Human Rights Watch likewise claims, “[U]nfounded diagnoses of mental 
retardation and other disorders . . . have helped to disseminate the widespread 
belief—which appears to be quite inaccurate—that virtually all of China’s 
abandoned children are physically or mentally handicapped.”49 In any event, it 
would be problematic to speculate on the rate of disability among abandoned 
children based on purported disability incidences among institutionalized orphans 
because, according to Johnson’s empirical research, “[i]t appears that many 
healthy abandoned children are found and quickly adopted without ever coming to 
the attention of the authorities.”50 Sick and disabled children, on the other hand, 
are unlikely to be informally adopted in this way, and thus are more likely to be 
put in state care.51  
Almost all of the children living in the non-state orphanages and foster 
homes I visited were either disabled or in need of surgical intervention. Here, 
“disabled” is used narrowly: the most common conditions observed were cerebral 
palsy, Down syndrome, blindness, paraplegia, mental retardation, club feet or 
missing limbs, spina bifida, and congenital heart disorders. The intersection of 
disability and abandonment was a common thread in my interviews, with most 
informants focusing on socio-cultural attitudes to disability and a lack of state 
welfare support for parents of disabled children as primary motivators behind 
abandonment. This is consistent with studies by Chinese scholars that have 
emphasized disability as a crucial factor in determining whether to abandon a 
child.52 The language often used by Chinese interviewees was that of such children 
being “thrown away” (rengdiao) rather than “abandoned or forsaken” (yiqi), which 
echoes the common colloquial term for social outcasts (including both orphans and 
                                                      
47 Human Rights Watch, supra note 40, at 207-208 (discussing official orphanage and 
government records deeming a large proportion of the institutionalized orphan population 
disabled, and asserting a “widespread practice of false medical labelling”); see also 
Interview with Will Peters, founder and CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing (Aug. 25, 
2009). 
48 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 500. 
49 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 5–6. 
50 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 500. 
51 Id. The intersection of disability and gender is important here: Johnson’s studies have 
also found that moderately disabled or critically ill boys were more likely to be adopted 
quickly than girls in similar conditions. Id. at 487. 
52 Shang, Wu & Li, supra note 46; Li et al., supra note 23, at 82. 
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disabled people), feiren (literally, “garbage people”). Most orphanage workers 
spoke with sympathy of the plight of rural farmers whose only child is born with 
grave special needs, and for whom access to state aid is difficult: 
 
Why are they abandoned? The main thing is their bodily defects. 
Because you know, in the rural villages, if you have a disabled 
child like this, parents would have to spend a lot of money. And 
they’re not able to go to work. So they have no choice. It’s not 
that they are willing and content to throw their child away, that’s 
not the mentality. It causes them great hardship, but they are 
compelled by their circumstances. You know very often, we have 
clothes and money left at our door—the parents know that their 
children are here, but they do not dare to come and visit, and see 
their child themselves. In their hearts they must suffer greatly. We 
have had mothers who came back because of the deep regret they 
have felt.53 
 
Johnson argues that while policy changes may be ineffective in increasing the 
adoption rate of disabled children, abandonment, a “practice clearly associated 
with great personal pain and shrouded in shameful collective silence,”54 could be 
reduced by supporting parents in their care of such children: 
 
People who abandon disabled children usually say they have no 
means to treat or raise the child, that the burden is too great. 
Furthermore the parents usually cannot place disabled children in 
state institutions without having to bear the financial burden, a 
burden too onerous for most families. If the state attempted to 
assume this financial burden for those who cannot afford the cost 
without undue hardship, these parents could place their children in 
state institutions but maintain ties with them. In some cases, 
providing financial support directly to families of disabled 
children might allow them to remain at home. The development of 
this sort of welfare policy is expensive, but housing abandoned 
disabled children is too. It is also destructive to the moral fabric of 
a society to have ordinary people pushed into abandoning their 
children.55 
                                                      
53 Interview with Sister Qin, founder and manager, Our Lady’s Home for Handicapped 
Children, in Hebei (Jul. 21, 2010). 
54 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 61. 
55 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 504. 
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This view was repeatedly echoed by the interviewees in the current study. 
Similarly, in its latest report on China, the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has recommended that the state “develop effective strategies to prevent the 
abandonment of children, which include early identification of families and 
children at risk and the possibility for social workers to intervene and help families 
directly.”56 
C. Kinship, Fostering and Adoption 
To contextualize China’s orphan welfare system, it is necessary to explore 
cultural norms related to kinship, the child’s place in Chinese families, and 
adoption. Traditional Chinese law, predicated on Confucian norms of filial piety 
and the sanctity of filial bloodlines, prohibited adoption outside of one’s clan,57 
and traditional Chinese texts “argue against adoption.”58 This view was echoed by 
some Chinese interviewees in the current study: “It’s harder to imagine taking in a 
stranger because family is so valued. It’s much easier to take in your sister’s child, 
or your brother’s child—that’s why adoption rates are very low in China.”59 
Guanghui Home has experienced many problems with using informal foster care 
arrangements to supplement the provision of care at their central orphanage, due to 
the way in which such foster children are regarded by their foster families:  
 
They [foster children] are outsiders. They are not part of your 
family. This can be a problem, I think. Fostership is not 
considered permanent, because eventually everyone knows the 
family will get ill, or have family troubles, and the child will be 
returned [to the orphanage].60  
                                                      
56 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39, art. 51(b). 
57 GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 87 (1996). 
58 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 481. Cf. Nancy Riley, American Adoptions of Chinese 
Girls: The Socio-Political Matrices of Individual Decisions, 20 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L. 
FORUM 87, 93 (1997) (“[M]otherhood and fatherhood—or their lack—play different roles 
in the identities and constructions of women and men in western society.”); Anne 
Thurston, In a Chinese Orphanage, 277 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 28 (1996), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/96apr/orphan/orphan.htm (noting the growing 
number of Americans who are adopting Chinese children). 
59 Interview with Chinese lawyer for New Grace Foundation, a foreign-run foster home 
outside of Beijing, in Beijing (Jul. 7, 2010). 
60 Interview with Charles Kramer, project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei (Jul. 9 2010); see 
also Interview with Lifei Chen, researcher, Beijing Normal University, in Beijing (Aug. 5, 
2009) (referring to the “family idea” as “stubbornly rooted” in China, meaning that “many 
prefer to adopt children from their relatives and kin”). 
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However, Johnson argues that certain strains of both Confucianism and 
modern culture “support adoptive ties outside as well as inside bloodlines and 
support the adoption of both boys and girls to build family and kinship.”61 This 
“competing ideology”62 is most evident in the notion of mingling zi (“mulberry 
insect children”). This was a term used in imperial China to refer to children 
adopted outside of the patrilineal bloodline. A folk tale of the time told of wasps 
“[taking] the young of the mulberry insect and transform[ing] them into young 
wasps”  by tapping on their nest and praying “[b]e like me, be like me.”63 Thus a 
“mulberry insect child” was “one who becomes the child of someone other than 
his or her birthparents,” a metaphor which Johnson remarks is “remarkable in its 
near total denial of the significance of heredity in shaping the child.”64 Rather than 
a denial of Confucian norms, the concept of an adopted child being transformed by 
adoption is, in fact, premised on a “Confucian emphasis on upbringing and 
cultivation as the key to character.”65 
 
One of Johnson’s key findings was a pattern of informal adoption of 
abandoned children: “[P]eople expressed few qualms about adopting children of 
unknown parentage as long as they were basically healthy, that is, without 
congenital disabilities.”66 Further, a prevalent assertion among Johnson’s sample 
of adoptive families was that feelings of love and obligation towards adopted 
children were at least as strong as those for birth-children, with the “low status and 
fragility of adoptive ties that seemed to have characterized adoption practices in 
the past” only reflected in a small number of cases.67  Importantly, despite almost 
all adoptions being informal and occurring outside the government adoption 
channels, the adoptive parents in the sample viewed their new parental rights and 
duties as “complete and permanent.”68 While this view contrasts with that of some 
interviewees in the current study, who spoke of extensive informal foster networks 
around the private orphanages in which bringing in an unrelated child is viewed 
differently, for other interviewees, the foster relationship is viewed similarly to the 
informal adoptive relationship studied by Johnson:  
                                                      
61 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 97-98. 
62 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 483 (quoting ANN BETH WALTNER, GETTING AN HEIR: 
ADOPTION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF KINSHIP IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 144 (1990)). 
63 Id. at 484. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 490. 
67 Id. at 495. 
68 Id. at 496. 
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They [local foster families] really love the kids. It’s more than just 
the money. We’ve got a few families who don’t want to do it 
again, because they fostered a child who was adopted and it just 
broke their hearts to say goodbye. It’s nice in a way; it shows how 
much love was being poured out.69  
 
Johnson concludes that, unlike in other cultures, such as Korea, where 
negative attitudes towards extra-familial adoption mean there are insufficient 
adoptive homes for homeless children, popular Chinese culture is supportive of the 
adoption of unrelated children, with government policy being the biggest obstacle 
to placing healthy abandoned children in homes.70 The rules and conditions for 
domestic adoption are restrictive and in line with the population control objectives 
of China’s One Child Policy. Until recently, the Adoption Law restricted domestic 
adoption (except in the case of disabled children and “true orphans”) to parents 
who are childless and over the age of thirty-five.71 In 1998, the Adoption Law was 
amended to allow “[o]rphans, disabled children, or abandoned infants and children 
whose parents cannot be ascertained or found and who are under the care of a 
social welfare institution” to be adopted irrespective of whether the adopter is 
childless,72 although the adopter must have reached the age of 30.73 People who 
adopt children without permission or in contravention of the Adoption Law (for 
                                                      
69 Interview with founder and director of New Grace Foundation, a foreign-run foster 
home outside of Beijing, in Beijing municipality (Sept. 17, 2009). 
70 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 503. 
71 Crystal J. Gates, China’s Newly Enacted Intercountry Adoption Law: Friend or Foe?, 7 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 389 n.151 (1999) (noting that under the pre-1998 
Adoption Law, “couples with children could only adopt orphans or children with special 
needs”); Robert Gordon, The New Chinese Export: Orphaned Children – An Overview of 
Adopting Children from China, 10 TRANSNAT’L LAW 121, 135 (1997) (noting, as of 1997, 
the requirement that parents wishing to adopt an abandoned child from China be age 35 or 
older, childless, and adopting only one child). 
72 Shouyang Fa (7F) [Adoption Law], art. 8 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1991, amended Nov. 4, 1988) 1998 China Law LEXIS 990; 
see also JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 69 (“Despite top-level support to improve conditions 
for ‘orphans,’ this major obstacle to bettering the care of foundlings [restrictive conditions 
for their adoption] was not addressed for years out of concern that changes would impinge 
on higher-priority family-planning efforts to bolster the ‘one-child policy’ by strictly 
limiting adoption to childless couples.”). 
73 Adoption Law, supra note 72, art. 6 (stipulating that adopters shall have reached the age 
of 30). 
2013]  CHINA’S ORPHAN WELFARE SYSTEM  143 
 
 
example, people who already have a child), receive the same birth-planning 
penalties as if they had given birth to them.74 
Johnson’s study does not delve deeply into whether similar patterns of 
norms and cultural beliefs hold true for disabled children, given that most of the 
adopted children in her sample were healthy. The anecdotal evidence from the 
current study, which dealt primarily with non-governmental homes caring for 
disabled or severely sick children, was that informal adoption is rarely an avenue 
for non-healthy children, given the economic and cultural factors that contributed 
to their abandonment in the first place. Zhou Xun, in a comprehensive study on the 
lack of discourse on disability in modern China, notes that the low public visibility 
of the disabled “is in itself an indication of social prejudice.”75 Many Chinese 
interviewees with years of experience working with disabled children spoke of the 
ridicule, shame, and economic hardship experienced by families with special-
needs children,76 all of which reduce an abandoned disabled child’s chances of 
finding a new home, either informally or through legal adoption channels.  Thus, 
disability is a key indicator of both abandonment and institutionalization, with 
abandoned disabled children ending up, for the most part, in state institutions with 
high mortality rates or with grassroots private orphanages run without state 
support. 
D. Status of the (Chinese) Child 
“Zhe shi zhongguo, haizi shi shehui de.” 
“This is China, children belong to society.”77 
 
They take an instrumental view of the value of a person. From a 
materialistic, family-centered social view, they lack this Christian 
perspective—that a person can have value beyond what he can do 
or has. You see this problem in families—if you are not male, or 
                                                      
74 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 164-67. 
75 Zhou Xun, The Discourse of Disability in Modern China, 36 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 
105, 105 (2002). 
76 Interviews with Sister Qin, supra note 53; Interviews with Madam Leng, supra note 15; 
Interview with Deborah Moran, volunteer coordinator, Yellow Leaf State Welfare 
Institution, in Jiangsu (Oct. 9 2009); see also id. at 105. 
77 Interview with Lydia, Chinese manager, Friendship Outreach, a foreign-run foster home 
near Beijing, in Beijing municipality (Jul. 29, 2010). 
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not 100% normal, the family goes through a very tough period—
they either fail and break up [the family], or reevaluate their life.78 
 
Also relevant to a deeper understanding of formal and informal orphan-
related policies are Chinese conceptions of human rights and equality, and how 
children are viewed therein. China engages extensively with the international 
human rights framework,79 which is predicated on the rhetoric of every person’s 
intrinsic, unassailable and equal right to dignity.80 However, the Chinese human 
rights discourse remains bound up in a local culture and tradition which tends to 
view children as valuable, first and foremost, for their instrumental role in the 
family and social hierarchy, rather than viewing rights as contingent on one’s 
intrinsic worth as an individual prior to society. Given the emphasis of both 
Confucian and Communist ideologies on duty to society and the goal of social 
harmony, it is unsurprising that the individualistic/atomistic framework of Western 
human rights discourse is not the framework underlying rights conceptualizations 
in China. The individual is, rather, conceptually embedded in, rather than prior to, 
society, with duties in turn emphasized prior to rights. Frederic Wakeman writes, 
“[M]ost Chinese citizens appear to conceive of social existence mainly in terms of 
obligation and interdependence rather than rights and responsibilities.”81 When 
one regards the “most basic level of Confucian morality,” that is, the strictly 
hierarchical relationships between father and son, husband and wife, and older and 
younger siblings,82 it is clear that equality of children with other members of 
                                                      
78 Interview with Charles Kramer, project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei (Jul. 9 2010) 
(discussing his view of the Chinese basis of human rights and value). 
79 See, e.g., U.S. – China Joint Statement, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement (“The United States and China reiterated their 
commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights, even as they continue to 
have significant differences on these issues.”); see also Ratification of International 
Human Rights Treaties – China, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-china.html (last accessed Apr. 5, 
2013) (noting the extensive list of international human rights treaties signed and ratified by 
China). 
80 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948) (referring, inter alia, to the “inherent dignity and [] 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”). 
81  Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western 
Reflections on Chinese Political Culture, 19 MOD. CHINA 108, 132-33 (1993); see also 
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 43 (2002) 
(“Rights were typically conceived of as grants from the state rather than natural rights 
which individuals possessed by reason of birth.”). 
82 HENRIETTA HARRISON, CHINA: INVENTING THE NATION 98, 172 (2001). 
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society is not a feature of the Confucian moral order. Rather, children are valued, 
above all, for their potential to fulfill familial and concomitantly social duties. 
This duty-based human rights ideology impacts the treatment of disabled 
children in modern Chinese society. Studies focusing on gender as a cause of 
abandonment often point to China’s patrilineal culture, in which women move 
from their descent line into that of their husband after marriage and, as a result, 
economically “females were seen as ‘temporary’ children who required a far 
greater investment of scarce resources than they would ever be able to return to 
their parents.”83 Analogous to this gender example is the disability example, in 
which a child’s right to care and concern is outweighed by a discourse which 
emphasizes that child’s inability to carry out his or her duties to family and 
society. This discourse is influenced not only by cultural attitudes towards girls 
and disabled children, but also by future social security needs of parents in a 
society, which still largely relies on child-provided care of the elderly—the phrase 
“filial piety” (yang’er fanglao) translates literally into “raising sons to prevent 
difficulties in old age.”84 As Biying Hu and Judith Szente write, “[i]t seems that 
the national emphasis on the Confucian acceptance of one’s social role in a 
hierarchical society has placed people with disabilities on the bottom of that social 
hierarchy.”85 
Eleanor Holroyd explores the influence of Confucian cultural influences 
on care-giving obligations towards children with disabilities, noting, “The primary 
Confucian guidelines are a duty-bound set of obligations of what a ‘right and 
proper’ person should and should not do. Being proper is central to the social role 
within Confucian-based Chinese society.”86 Children, including disabled children, 
who are seen as unable to carry out their “right and proper” obligations are 
considered disturbances to family and, therefore, social harmony: 
                                                      
83 Jimmerson, supra note 34, at 52; see also Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 475 (“The 
main problem with daughters is that they ‘belong to other people.’”). 
84 Leslie K. Wang, Children on the Margins: The Global Politics of Orphanage Care in 
Contemporary China 19 (2010) (unpublished D. Phil dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review). 
85  Biying Hu & Judith Szente, The Care and Education of Orphan Children with 
Disabilities in China: Progress and Remaining Challenges, 86 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 78, 79 
(2009); see also Meng Deng et al., The Development of Special Education in China: A 
Sociocultural Review, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 288, 289 (2001) (discussing the 
social status of people with disabilities in Confucianism); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, 
supra note 40, at 6 (“Official press reports indicate that the Chinese government may also 
have given serious consideration to allowing euthanasia for handicapped children, but has 
declined to do so for fear of the international repercussions.”). 
86  Eleanor Holroyd, Chinese Cultural Influences on Parental Caregiving Obligations 
Toward Children With Disabilities, 13 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 4, 4 (2003). 
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[A]lthough a Confucian notion of a right and proper person is 
associated with taking a moral place in the world, it is also about 
how an imperfect or diseased body or mind is seen as incomplete 
and without moral standing. This has the effect of challenging 
foundational models of self and personhood and their translation 
into ancestry, on which obligations rest. These violations are most 
dramatically manifest in children with a handicap.87 
 
Holroyd goes on to conclude: 
 
Chinese children who have disabilities represent disruptions to the 
flow of exchanges, in that giving good things to ill children might 
not make life meaningful in the usual cultural sense understood by 
a Chinese parent. Thus the ‘natural’ progression of patterns of 
reciprocity that flow over into ancestry and birth is neither 
immediate, in the forms of gratitude, nor generalized, in the form 
of delayed care, with debts never able to be reclaimed.88 
 
Matthew Kohrman moves beyond this instrumental connection between 
disability and familial duty to describe a deeper, more intrinsic nexus between 
disability and moral duty in traditional Chinese discourse.89 In his ethnographic 
study of disability in modern China, he argues that the emphasis placed on visible 
difference in modern China “can no doubt be linked to the emphasis that China’s 
classical canon gives to the preservation of the human form”90: 
 
Possibly the most oft-invoked example, in this regard, one which 
has served as a moral axiom for centuries, is found in the Book of 
Filial Piety. There, Confucius is described as teaching that all 
children have the filial duty to preserve the body given them by 
their ancestors and to not allow even their hair or skin to be 
injured.91 
 
                                                      
87 Id. at 10–11. 
88 Id. at 18. 
89  MATTHEW KOHRMAN, BODIES OF DIFFERENCE: EXPERIENCES OF DISABILITY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY IN THE MAKING OF MODERN CHINA 62 (2005). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. (warning Chinese scholars against a simplistic vision of “‘Chinese culture’ as 
equivalent to statements attributed to a famous sage,” which should be borne in mind here 
and throughout). 
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Negative cultural beliefs about, and attitudes towards, disability remain 
evident in aspects of modern Chinese society—for example, in eugenics 
campaigns “stressing the need for ‘fewer but better’ children,”92 and in the Law on 
Maternal and Infant Health Care which requires doctors to discuss the termination 
of fetuses found to have genetic diseases or defects of a “serious nature.”93 
Leslie Wang argues that modern Chinese political discourse, with its 
emphasis on the overall mental, moral, and physical “quality” (suzhi) of the 
population, has resulted in “lines of stratification being drawn among offspring,”94 
with healthy children considered more worthy of state and parental investment. 
Sick or disabled children living in orphanages are considered “part of the 
‘constitutive outside’ of state-sanctioned Chinese modernity, helping to define the 
center of social belonging through the qualities that they are perceived to lack.”95 
On the other hand, social and cultural attitudes towards, and meanings of, 
“disability” continue to evolve, and it is overly simplistic to characterize modern 
conceptions of disabled children as denigrative: “[c]anji [disability/disabled] has 
been emerging and metamorphosing in China as a social, political, and somatic 
sphere of existence in recent decades.”96 While it is neither possible nor wise to 
speculate on the extent to which duty-based conceptualizations of children’s rights 
has impacted abandonment and the care of orphans in China today, an awareness 
of the different starting point to human rights discussions is necessary to consider 
the system of orphan care more generally.  
IV. POLICY ON CARE OF ORPHANS 
A. Government Departments 
Before examining the various statutory instruments and policies relevant 
to orphanages, this article will outline the government structure and introduce the 
various state authorities that have an interest in this area of regulation. Party and 
government structures are organized in a roughly symmetrical fashion, under the 
National Party Congress and the National People’s Congress (NPC) respectively, 
                                                      
92 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 27. 
93 Muying Baojian Fa (D&F) [Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care], art. 18 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 1994, effective June 
1, 1995) 1994 China Law LEXIS 1118. 
94 Wang, supra note 84, at 1. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 KOHRMAN, supra note 89, at xi. 
148 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8 
 
with the NPC being China’s “putative legislature.” 97  Frequently, legislative 
functions and policy deliberations occur at the NPC Standing Committee and the 
State Council (guowuyuan), the chief administrative authority of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), levels. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzhengbu) of 
the PRC is subordinate to the State Council, and is responsible for “social and 
administrative affairs,”98 including welfare programs for marginal groups, and is 
complemented by MCA bureaus at both the provincial and local level. In addition 
to the regulations and policies promulgated by the central MCA, provincial and 
local MCA bureaus issue their own implementing regulations, which means that 
the applicable regulatory framework may differ depending on one’s location. 
Linda Wong’s study of the MCA, Marginalization and Social Welfare in China, 
provides an overview of the issues confronting the MCA in fulfilling its goals, the 
first of which is role ambiguity: “Its impossibly wide range of duties, their 
disparate nature, and lack of coherence are not conducive to the emergence of 
agency goals and mission.”99 She further argues that the local agency structure is 
inadequate because at the bureaucracy’s weakest point, the township and village 
levels, “where the majority of the rural masses are administered . . . the whole 
range of civil affairs duty is usually handled by one to two civil affairs assistants,” 
a manning structure Wong characterizes as “woefully deficient.”100 Furthermore, 
MCA bureaus face financial struggles that are “unbroken tales in the long saga of 
a half-starved organization.”101 
Within the MCA bureaucracy are several departments and sub-bureaus, 
the most relevant of which are the China Center of Adoption Affairs,102 the 
exclusive governmental adoption agency, and the Social Welfare and Charity 
Promotion Division,103 which oversees the Child Welfare Agency.104 In addition to 
its responsibility for foreign adoption issues, the Center of Adoption Affairs 
oversees state orphanages. The Social Welfare and Charity Promotion Division is 
mandated to develop social welfare policies and standards for the protection of 
orphans, disabled children and other special groups.105 
                                                      
97 KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 176 
(2d ed.1992). 
98 MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS (Sept. 15 2009), http://www.mca.gov.cn. 
99 WONG, supra note 11, at 153. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Zhongguo shouyang zhongxin ($ ). 
103 Shehui fuli he cishan shiye cujin si (*+"1). 
104 Ertong fuli chu (	,+). 
105 Id. 
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B. Chinese Orphanages: The State Monopoly and Privately-filled 
Gaps 
Dr. Shang outlines the development of orphanages in China.106 Before 
1949, orphanages across China were established by a variety of operators, 
including local governments, individuals, churches, and charities. After the PRC 
was founded in 1949, a transitional period ensued, during which some orphanages 
were closed and some were “taken over by the new government and reorganized 
as state orphanages.”107 Today, “the government continues to monopolize the 
operation of children’s welfare homes,” and the state system of orphan care is 
“characterized by its rural-urban duality.”108 All orphaned and abandoned children 
in China’s urban areas are eligible to be cared for by state orphanages, while those 
in rural areas and children of long-term prisoners are not entitled to state 
welfare.109 Further, due to increasing abandonment rates that are not matched by a 
concomitant expansion of state orphanage capacity, existing orphanages are 
overwhelmed and face heavy pressure in providing adequate care for urban 
orphans.110 As a result, and because the government has a monopoly on the 
operation of children’s welfare homes, the vast majority of orphans (that is, those 
residing in rural areas) are looked after either by relatives, the customary practice 
of nongcun wubao, or in unregistered and unrecognized private orphanages.111 
Johnson’s study on abandonment and adoption show that a large number 
of orphans and foundlings are being informally adopted without registration (and, 
therefore, usually without hukou),112 a phenomenon that is closely related to the 
emergence of private and informal orphanages. As Human Rights Watch notes: 
[T]he whereabouts of the great majority of China’s orphans [is] 
still [] a complete mystery, leaving crucial questions about the 
country’s child welfare system unanswered and suggesting that 
the real scope of the catastrophe that has befallen China’s 
                                                      
106 Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 205-06. 
107 Id. at 205. 
108 Id. 
109 Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 127. 
110 Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 208. 
111 Id. at 205-206; Shang, Welfare Provision, supra note 4, 124. 
112 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 496-8 (on “Negative consequences of state laws and 
policies on abandoned adopted children,” noting difficulties faced by adoptive parents of 
abandoned children in registering those adoptions and attaining household registration or 
hukou for their adopted children, but noting that it was sometimes possible, depending on 
one’s location, to buy a hukou if one can afford it). 
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unwanted children may be far larger than the evidence . . . 
documents.113 
 
Dr. Shang’s survey found 66,000 of an estimated 573,000 orphans are in 
state welfare institutes.114 The most recent government report puts the figure at 
87,000;115 however, only 70% of those children are in specialized child welfare 
institutes (ertong fuliyuan; as of 2011, there were 397 child welfare institutes in 
China).116 The remaining 30% reside alongside disabled, elderly, and mentally 
disturbed adults in the more general social welfare institutes (shehui fuliyuan), but 
it is unclear what proportion of these children are themselves mentally or 
physically unwell.117 
Orphanages and foster homes run by individuals and churches are an 
alternative, parallel, and often unacknowledged system of care to the state-
operated welfare institutions. Although a small proportion of China’s orphans and 
foundlings are cared for in state orphanages, there are no official statistics or 
estimates on the number of non-government orphanages in existence in China 
today, by whom they are run, or for how many children they care. Yet, these 
private orphanages are anecdotally prolific, and form an important aspect of 
orphan care to which little attention has been paid in existing scholarship.118 
                                                      
113 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 3. 
114 SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 27. 
115 Shehui Fuwuye Tongji Jibao (M=SW'5 ) [Social Services Statistics 
Quarterly Report], 2012 Nian 4 Jidu (2012 4) [2012 Fourth Quarter Statistics], 
MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS (Jan. 28, 2013), available at 
http://files2.mca.gov.cn/cws/201301/20130128174655179.htm (listing the number of 
central state supported orphans as 87,000). 
116 2011 Nian Shehui Fuwu Fazhan Tongji Gongbao (2011 *&.0
#) 
[2011 Statistical Bulletin], MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS (Jun. 21, 2012, 9:20 AM), 
available at http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/201210/20121000362598.shtml (reporting a 
total of 60,000 child welfare institution beds). The reliability of these government statistics 
is uncertain, in light of recent scandals wherein purported government orphanages have 
been found not, in fact, to exist. Tania Branigan, Chinese Officials Ask to Borrow Orphans 
to Hide Child Welfare Failings, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2013, 12:21 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/chinese-officials-borrow-orphans-failings 
(reporting on a local government orphanage which was being used for office space, despite 
receiving state funding). 
117 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 120 (“[T]he ‘segregated management’ 
orphan-care policy which the government has claimed to pursue since 1956 . . . has only 
rarely [been] achieved in practice.”). 
118 See also Anna Jane High, Grassroots NGO Regulation and China’s Local Legal 
Culture, 9 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. (2013) (forthcoming) (discussing the state-society 
(continued next page) 
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C. Orphanage Law and Policy 
When Alain and Brigitte established their foster home for blind and 
visually impaired orphans, they named it Good News Foster Home.119 However, 
presumably uneasy at the attention that this name drew to Alain’s vision and 
mission, various Chinese officials and authorities discouraged them from using the 
phrase “foster home” because “it’s illegal for foreigners to foster Chinese 
children.”120 I asked Alain to explain this emphasis on appearances and names 
rather than on the actual work of Good News, of which authorities were already 
aware, and had allowed for many years: 
 
When we speak to officials, they don’t give you the feeling that 
you’re doing something illegal—actually they’re pretty 
encouraging at that central level. They’re quite visionary people at 
the top. But they tell us we need to speak to the guy downstairs, 
and that’s where the problems start. The middle guys are not in it 
for the kids. So the top guys tell us to take it slowly, that it takes 
time. They don’t want to tell us what to do—they wouldn’t tell us 
to do something illegal–rather they keep it blurry. It’s not clear. 
They don’t tell you to leave, but they don’t tell you how to stay. 
 
Good News’ experience is typical of the private orphanages and foster 
homes interviewed, which find themselves working in a field the legality of which 
is ambiguous at best. Dr. Shang writes that, based on an interview with an official 
from the MCA, central policy stipulates that only state-run welfare institutions 
may lawfully care for orphaned and abandoned children in China.121 However, 
making such a broad statement is problematic: “government” is a cumbersome 
entity in China that does not always present a unified front. Certainly, both the 
Chinese nationals and foreigners running the private orphanages interviewed 
stated that local and provincial level officials frequently refer to their operations as 
“illegal” or “not allowed,” usually on the basis of an assertion that only the 
government can care for Chinese orphans. The one state orphanage director who 
                                                                                                                                        
interaction between Chinese private orphanages and local authorities, and attendant local 
understandings of law and regulation). 
119 Interview with Alain & Brigitte, founders and directors of Good News Training Center 
(formerly Good News Foster Home), in Beijing (Aug. 20, 2010). 
120 Id. 
121 Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 125. 
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was willing to be interviewed denied knowledge of any foreign-run foster homes, 
despite the fact that other foster homes interviewed were caring for dozens of 
children from his facility.122  
The political engagement and sensitivity of both abandonment and child 
welfare are key issues in any discussion of orphanage policies. Shang argues that, 
due to the government’s monopoly on residential orphan care, maintenance and 
development of the state’s orphanage sector was dependent on government 
appropriation, which was in turn dependent on national financial and political 
considerations rather than the interests of orphans.123 She explains: 
 
During this time, the situation of orphans became a kind of 
political symbol: either it was regarded as a manifestation of so-
called socialist advantages or as something that brought shame to 
the socialist society when things were going wrong. The interests 
of children themselves, however, were hidden from view by 
political considerations. Efforts to seek other financial resources, 
such as appealing to society for donations, were implicitly or 
explicitly banned for political reasons.124 
 
The issue of state versus non-state orphan care is understandably a 
politically sensitive one, and the state is especially sensitive about foreign and 
church-affiliated service providers. Consequently, opacity, ambiguity, and 
inconsistency in relevant government policies and laws are expected and evident. 
In central-level statutory and subordinate instruments, there is one 
reference to the care of orphans under Article 43 of the Law on the Protection of 
Minors,125 which provides, inter alia, that orphaned and abandoned children shall 
be accepted by and cared for by orphanages established by MCA departments.126 
This is the only on-point legislative guidance, and it can be read as a duty 
exclusively bestowed upon the government. However, there are several policy-
type instruments that exist in relation to orphan welfare, which, given the blurred 
                                                      
122 Interview with Hedong City State Welfare Institute, in Shandong (Sep. 21, 2009). 
123 Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 206. 
124 Id. 
125 Weicheng Nianren Baohu Fa (>3.
4F) [Law on the Protection of Minors], art. 
43 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Of the People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1991, revised 
Dec. 29, 2006, effective June 1, 2007) 2006 China Law LEXIS 9895. 
126 The Law on the Protection of Minors also includes a general and idealized duty on the 
state and other citizens to protect minors. Id. art. 6 (“The State, society, schools and 
families shall teach and help minors to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests, 
enhance their consciousness and capacities of protecting themselves, and enhance their 
sense of social responsibility.”). 
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boundaries in China between legislation (“hard” law) and policy (“soft” law), may 
bear significantly on the “legal” landscape. For example, the more recent Joint 
Ministerial Opinion on Strengthening Orphan Relief appears more open to 
collaborative efforts with civil society with respect to the care of orphans.127 The 
Opinion is one of several policy documents that were issued in the flurry of 
bureaucratic activity that occurred between 2006 and 2007 in conjunction with the 
Blue Sky Implementation Plan.128 Part 2.3 of the Opinion stipulates that orphans in 
the guardianship of the MCA may be placed in community orphan welfare homes, 
orphan schools, SOS Children’s Villages,129  and other such organizations. In 
addition, the Opinion refers to the mobilization of social forces to assist orphans, 
and the need to encourage civil society and other social forces to support 
participation in child welfare and orphan assistance projects. 130  The express 
reference to SOS Children’s Villages by name, and the absence of any reference to 
other foreign foster homes, may be interpreted as meaning the Opinion only 
contemplates allowing this particular foreign-led effort to play a role in the sector. 
More directly on point are the Interim Measures for the Management of 
Fostering Care by Families (Fostering Care Measures), 131  and the Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions.132 The former 
allow for orphaned children to be placed with foster families,133 coordinated by 
                                                      
127 STRENGTHENING ORPHAN RELIEF, supra note 10. 
128 See MINZHENGBU YINFA (E8Z) [MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS], MINZHENGBU YINFA
“ERTONG FULI JIGOU JIANSHE LANTIAN JIHUA” SHISHI FANG’AN (E8Z
QN?A0XT!W*;:B ) [CHILD WELFARE INSTITUTE BLUE SKY 
CONSTRUCTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM] (Feb. 1, 2007), 
http://fss.mca.gov.cn/article/gzdt/200711/20071100003905.shtml (explaining the Blue Sky 
Implementation Plan); see also infra note 172. 
129 SOS Children’s Villages are set up under a long-term MCA project, in cooperation with 
an Austrian charity that establishes privately funded foster homes. For more information 
on SOS Children’s Villages, see About our Charity,  SOS CHILDREN, 
http://www.soschildrensvillages.org.uk/about-our-charity. 
130 STRENGTHENING ORPHAN RELIEF, supra note 10, at 1, 5. 
131 Jiating Jiyang Guanli Zanxing Banfa (+/,RH<UF) [Interim Measures for 
the Management of Fostering Care by Families], (adopted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
Oct. 27, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004), available at 
http://sxxincheng.mca.gov.cn/article/zcwj/201303/20130300430773.shtml. 
132 Shehui Fuli Jigou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (MN?ARH<UF) [Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions], art. 11 (adopted by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Dec. 30, 1999), available at 
http://sxxincheng.mca.gov.cn/article/zcwj/201303/20130300431147.shtml. 
133 For a discussion of the increased focus of MCA policy on foster families to supplement 
institutional care, see Shang, Better Way, supra note 11. 
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provincial-level MCA bureaus in conjunction with approved social welfare 
institutions (shehui fuli jigou) and child welfare institutions (ertong fuli jigou). 
However, the Fostering Care Measures do not appear to contemplate moving 
children from state orphanages to private foster homes because they only refer to 
foster families; further, while foreigners are not prima facie precluded from 
fostering in their individual capacity, anecdotally this has not met with state 
approval.134 A number of the private orphanages interviewed coordinate foster 
family programs under which healthier children are sent to live with preapproved 
local Chinese families. Chapter IV of the Fostering Care Measures refers to “social 
welfare institutions engaged in foster family work”;135 however, county level or 
higher MCA bureaus must approve such institutions. 
The Interim Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare 
Institutions (Social Welfare Measures) were promulgated by the central MCA in 
1999 to “strengthen the management of social welfare organizations and thereby 
promote the healthy development of social welfare.” 136  “Social welfare 
organization” is defined to include groups organized by state welfare agencies, 
social organizations, and individuals that provide maintenance, rehabilitation and 
trustee-type services to orphans and abandoned children.137 In theory, the Social 
Welfare Measures thus seem to allow private homes to care for children. However, 
to be lawfully established under these Measures, all homes (whether run by state 
welfare agencies, social organizations or individuals) must be granted a Social 
Welfare Institution Certificate of Approval in accordance with the Measures.138 
Importantly, the Social Welfare Measures reference foreigners applying for 
permission to establish such an organization.139 These Measures also contain 
provisions relating to internal governance and MCA supervision of social welfare 
institutions,140  and require local and provincial level governments to set and 
implement standards.141 Of the private orphanages interviewed, only one was 
aware of any legislative or policy instruments allowing NGOs to obtain official 
                                                      
134  Three of the interviewees, mainly volunteer coordinators working with state 
orphanages, have been able, after a number of years developing personal relationships with 
state orphanage directors, to foster babies or children in extenuating circumstances. These 
arrangements are always unofficial and “off the books.” Indeed this is usually how the 
larger, established foreign-run private orphanages begin operations (see below). 
135 Interim Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions, supra note 132, 
art. 11. 
136 Id. art. 1. 
137 Id. art. 2. 
138 Id. art. 11. 
139 Id. art. 8. 
140 Id. art. 5. 
141 Id. art. 9, s. 3. 
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permission to care for orphans; however, as the founder of Red Thread pointed 
out, the Social Welfare Measures are of little use for start-up foster homes because 
they require an applicant to demonstrate adequate funding, facilities, and premises, 
which impoverished, domestic-run, private orphanages are unable to do. 142 
Further, because these Measures prohibit welfare organizations from operating 
without an approval certificate,143 it may be risky for long-established, foreign-run, 
private orphanages to seek approval following years of unauthorized operations.  
The state orphanage director interviewed did allude to a government 
policy enabling private citizens to apply for government permission to establish 
foster homes—most likely a reference to the Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Social Welfare Institutions. However, he was also clear that the 
government looks unfavorably on such enterprises, and the practice of caring for 
orphans outside the state orphanage system is not encouraged, at least in his 
province. In any case, the language in the Measures seems permissive rather than 
mandatory – there is no duty, on the MCA to approve applications for a Social 
Welfare Institution Certificate of Approval that meet the criteria.  
The Adoption Law144 and the Protection of Disabled Persons Law145 are 
peripherally relevant to the care of orphans. Article 5 of the Adoption Law 
provides that the following citizens or institutions are entitled to place children 
into adoption: guardians of orphans, social welfare institutions, and parents who 
are unable to rear their children due to unusual circumstances.146 “Social welfare 
institution” (shehui fuli jigou) is not defined, but generally is used by the MCA to 
refer only to state-run institutions.147 Article 17 provides that relatives or friends of 
their parents may support orphans or children whose parents are unable to rear 
                                                      
142 Id. art. 8; see also interview with retired MCA official, in Beijing (Aug. 12, 2010) 
(stating that private citizens can get approval to run an orphanage, but that the process is 
costly). 
143 Shehui Fuli Jigou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (MN?ARH<UF) [Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions] art. 28 (adopted by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Dec. 30, 1999). 
144 Shouyang Fa (7F) [Adoption Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1991, amended Nov. 4, 1988) 1998 China Law LEXIS 990. 
145 Canjiren Baozhang Fa (CI
[F) [Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, effective May 
15, 1991) 1990-1992 FALÜ QUANSHU 1268 (China), translated in 14 P.R.C. LAWS & REGS 
V-03-00-101 (“Maltreatment and abandoning of disabled persons shall be prohibited.”). 
146 Adoption Law, supra note 144, art. 5. 
147 See, e.g., Social Services Statistics Quarterly Report, supra note 115, and 2011 
Statistical Bulletin, supra note 116. 
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them, and the adoptive relationship shall not apply in this case.148 Article 21 
provides that foreigners may adopt a child in China only in accordance with the 
Adoption Law of the PRC.149 Article 7 of the Protection of Disabled Persons Law 
provides that grassroots-level organizations (inter alia) “shall do their work for the 
disabled well, as is within their responsibility.”150 Article 9 requires legal fosterers 
of disabled persons to fulfill their duties toward their charges.151  Article 43 
provides that governments at various levels and the society shall establish welfare 
centers and other placement and foster institutions for disabled persons.152 
V. STATE ORPHANAGES 
In 1995, Britain’s Channel 4 broadcast a documentary on China’s 
orphanages titled The Dying Rooms: China’s Darkest Secret, which was shortly 
followed by publication of Human Rights Watch/Asia’s investigation, Death by 
Default: A Policy of Fatal Neglect in China’s State Orphanages.153 The report was 
a stunning, albeit arguably sensationalized, indictment of the conditions in state 
orphanages across China, including what was, at the time, touted as the country’s 
model orphanage—the Shanghai Children’s Welfare Institute (CWI). Johnson 
states that orphanages are disadvantaged places in general, and that 
institutionalized care for infants is linked with high mortality rates in many 
countries.154 However, the Human Rights Watch report went further. The report 
was based on documented evidence of systematic abuse in the Shanghai CWI and 
the 1989-1990 orphanage mortality rates published by Chinese MCA authorities 
for several provinces, which were between fifty and eighty percent.155 It concludes 
that a “pattern of cruelty, abuse, and malign neglect [] has dominated child welfare 
work in China since the early 1950s, and [] now constitutes one of the country’s 
gravest human rights problems.”156 
Based largely on official MCA documents, as well as reports from two 
whistleblowers (a former doctor and a former resident of the Shanghai CWI), 
Death By Default calculates that, for a newly admitted orphan in China’s welfare 
institutions nationwide, the likelihood of survival beyond one year was less than 
                                                      
148 Adoption Law, supra note 144, art. 17. 
149 Id. art. 21. 
150 Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons, supra note 145, art. 7. 
151 Id. art. 9. 
152 Id. art. 43. 
153 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 173. 
154 Johnson et al., supra note 22, 469. 
155 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 2. 
156 Id. at 1. 
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fifty percent in 1989.157 At the Shanghai CWI, the total mortality of orphans in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was estimated at ninety percent.158 The Human Rights 
Watch report also documents medical records and testimony, which evidence a 
pervasive practice of “summary resolution”—the selection of “unwanted infants 
and children for death by intentional deprivation of food and water.”159 
 
On the basis of documents published by the Chinese authorities 
themselves, Human Rights Watch/Asia has established that the 
People’s Republic has not, at any time since its foundation, 
attempted to provide adequate care for orphans and other 
dependent groups, such as the handicapped, the destitute elderly, 
and the mentally disabled. . . . For the majority of abandoned 
children in China today, the state’s policy of malign neglect means 
an early and lingering death.160 
 
The report goes on to explain: 
 
China’s urban orphanages and other institutions for children serve 
a largely symbolic function, representing the state’s public 
commitment to the humane treatment of abandoned infants but in 
practice making almost no effort to keep them alive.161 
 
International response to the Human Rights Watch report was immediate 
and grave. However, the report should be treated with caution, given that 
inferences about deliberate, policy-based abuse and “summary resolution” are 
drawn based on evidence from one orphanage. Johnson rejects the report’s 
“sweeping thesis” of routine murder across China through deliberate starvation,162 
arguing that, while the high mortality rates in orphanages across China in the early 
1990s were documented by local officials and Chinese government statistics,163 the 
explanation for these alarming rates involves many factors, of which “most [were] 
beyond the control of the orphanage staff.”164  
                                                      
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 2. 
159 Id. at 5, 147-48. 
160 Id. at 15. 
161 Id. at 77. 
162 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 41-48. 
163 Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 469. 
164 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 43. 
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In the years since the publication of Death by Default, many scholars and 
researchers have reported excellent progress made in China’s state orphanages, 
including increased funding from international NGOs and foreign adoption 
agencies.165 Shang cites a number of MCA policies and documents promulgated 
since the 1990s, which demonstrate that “the Chinese government has been 
actively seeking proper ways to protect orphaned or abandoned children,” a 
process that “has clearly accelerated since 1998.”166 Johnson’s research suggests 
that, “By the end of the 1990s orphanage conditions had improved dramatically in 
many places thanks to increased government funding, funds generated by 
international adoption, and increasing participation by international charitable 
organizations.”167 However, comments the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has made as recently as 2005 indicate that progress is still required to ensure 
that all deaths of children in state institutions are “properly documented and 
investigated, and that appropriate follow-up actions are taken when necessary,”168 
as well as ensuring that “all forms of alternative care meet quality standards in 
conformity with the Convention.”169 
Many interviewees with first-hand experience of conditions in state 
orphanages spoke of dire conditions, inadequate care and medical treatment, and, 
in some cases, the continuance of “summary resolution.”170 Others emphasized 
that the institutions with which they cooperate are making genuine efforts to help 
their wards, and that much progress has been made.171 However, it is impossible to 
make generalizations about the conditions in China’s state orphanages. At most, 
there appears to be a large disparity in the conditions and levels of care in 
orphanages across China, with much depending on the particular institution’s 
director and financial position (most orphanage funding is local rather than 
central). Further, the legacy of Western “exposés” of Chinese orphanage 
conditions in the mid-1990s, such as Death by Default, has endured to the present 
day. Despite improvements across the various, diverse orphanages, “the shocking 
images of ‘dying rooms’ have not been replaced with more current representations 
                                                      
165 Catherine Keyser, The Role of the State and NGOs in Caring for At-risk Children: The 
Case of Orphan Care, in STATE AND SOCIETY: RESPONSES TO SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS IN 
CHINA 45, 60 (Jonathan Schwartz & Shawn Shieh eds., 2009). 
166 Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 211. 
167 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 222 n.61. 
168 Comm. On the Rights of the Child, supra note 39, art. 51(e). 
169 Id. art. 51(d). 
170 See, e.g., Interview with David Dale, founder, New Grace Foundation, in Beijing 
municipality (Sep. 17, 2009); Lisa Murray, founder, Friendship Outreach, in Beijing (Aug. 
24, 2009). 
171 See, e.g., Interview with Elisa Zhang, P.R. Officer, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing 
municipality (Aug. 21, 2009); Interview with Alain & Brigitte, supra note 119. 
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of Chinese institutional care and thus remain entrenched in the international social 
imaginary.”172 
The Chinese government has not been unresponsive to the welfare needs 
of its orphaned and abandoned children. Johnson points to policy measures that 
were put in place before publication of the Human Rights Watch report to improve 
orphanage conditions, including increased recourse to international adoption and 
cooperation with international charities.173 More recently, in June 2006, President 
Hu Jintao, during a visit to a state orphanage, called for all children to be able to 
develop equally under the same blue sky, with orphans benefiting from the same 
opportunities as other children.174 In response, and as a means of implementing 
Hu’s call, the MCA issued the Blue Sky Implementation Plan.175 The five-year 
program, which commenced in 2006, aimed to invest central and local government 
funding in the construction of new state orphanages and in the improvement of 
existing state orphanages. The program set per capita construction targets, and 
provided for the corresponding government subsidization of state orphanages. The 
ministry allocated 200 million RMB annually to building welfare institutions in 
each prefecture-level city across China.176 Four interviewees expressed skepticism 
about the value of the Blue Sky Plan, which was focused on institutional rather 
than family-based care, because some children reportedly were being removed 
from family-based foster care to fill the newly built orphanages. A similar orphan-
targeted central policy was the Tomorrow Plan, launched in 2004, which was 
intended to benefit orphans with disabilities by providing free treatment or surgical 
rehabilitation to 35,000 children in state institutions.177 
VI. PRIVATE ORPHANAGES 
The private orphanage sector includes both grassroots Chinese-run 
orphanages, which care for children surrendered directly into their care, and foster 
homes, which are run mostly by foreign mission workers and care for children 
fostered from state institutions for short- or long-term treatment and guardianship. 
These non-government homes are, for the most part, operating without formally 
                                                      
172 Wang, supra note 84, at 9. 
173 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 188. 
174  Nationwide Plan for Better Care of Orphans, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 29, 2006), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_770291.htm. 
175 Child Welfare Institute Blue Sky Construction Plan Implementation Program, supra 
note 128. 
176 Nationwide Plan for Better Care of Orphans, supra note 174. 
177 Hu & Szente, supra note 85, at 83. 
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registering as charitable organizations or welfare homes, without legal standing, 
and without any kind of formal state regulation or oversight.  
 
A. Grassroots Chinese-run Private Orphanages 
The situation of grassroots, unregistered, private Chinese orphanages has 
not been studied from a legal perspective: the most comprehensive English study 
is by Dr. Xiaoyuan Shang. In Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children: The 
Missing Role of the State, Shang and her colleagues examine the situation of 
grassroots, non-state, Chinese-run orphanages based on field interviews in China, 
using Guanghui as a case study. 178  Such homes typically are established 
spontaneously and from necessity, and in rural areas, when children are abandoned 
into the care of known Christians or do-gooders due to the shortage of accessible 
state orphanages or other welfare initiatives. Gradual expansion occurs as these 
homes come to be viewed by local residents and police as de facto orphanages; 
however, according to Shang’s study, such grassroots orphanages are routinely 
denied formal state recognition as welfare institutions.179  
This article’s survey of Chinese-run private orphanages included both 
unregistered organizations operating independently of state authorities, and 
previously independent orphanages that have secured working partnerships with 
government bureaus. In 2010, I spent several weeks at Guanghui and Our Lady’s 
Home for the Handicapped, both of which are homes for orphans and foundlings 
run by nuns of the unofficial Catholic Church, in order to better understand the 
day-to-day life and experiences of resident children and sisters. In addition, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of five other private, Chinese-
run orphanages. Four of these orphanages (including one that is no longer in 
operation) are or were associated with underground churches. The remaining 
surveyed homes are not connected with religious communities. 
The fieldwork shows that informal orphanage operations are abundant in 
the provinces visited, and constitute grassroots efforts to fill actual or perceived 
gaps in the state’s provision of welfare.180 Each interviewee from the seven private 
                                                      
178 Id. at 1. 
179 Id. at 130-131 (describing Guanghui’s unsuccessful attempts to gain legal status), 132 
(“It is beyond the power of the local authority to give a formal registration to any of the 
[non-governmental children’s welfare institutions] in its province. According to the law, it 
is illegal for NGOs to run children’s welfare homes.”). 
180 Whether the existence of such open and accessible local initiatives is itself impacting on 
the incidence of abandonment in rural areas is an important question, beyond the scope of 
this study. Hu and Szente refer to the concern of state orphanage directors that increased 
media attention has led to an increased in instances of abandonment within her district, a 
(continued next page) 
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orphanage case studies listed at least three other private orphanages in their 
respective provinces of which they were aware, despite the fact that networks of 
mutual support among the homes appeared weak to non-existent. 181  I also 
interviewed two Western individuals, Father Thomas and Charles Kramer, who 
are full-time advocates for the Catholic private orphanages, working to enhance 
their administrative capabilities and fundraising power. Both estimate that there 
are dozens of private homes in the northern provinces surrounding Beijing alone, 
and probably hundreds across China. A large number of such orphanages are 
operated by or in close affiliation with “underground” or unofficial churches.  
Based on the grassroots orphanages observed and reported in the field, 
such homes tend to arise in response to local need and gaps in state-provided 
welfare. Where state orphanages admit their resident children through official 
channels, the private orphanages are often founded out of necessity, following the 
discovery of abandoned children in a particular region. This was the case for all 
three Catholic orphanages that were interviewed, and is typical of such homes. It is 
common for abandoning parents to leave their children near church buildings, or 
for children found in public spaces to be brought to known Christians in the area, 
in the absence of state-provided alternatives. Over time, large numbers of 
foundlings come to be cared for by overwhelmed parishioners, before they are 
brought together under the supervision of church leaders for central care. 
Other orphanages are established as a planned response to a perceived 
need in a community, and become, over time and as word spreads, regular 
recipients of abandoned children or, in the case of Star Village, children of 
prisoners who have no other caregivers. Harriet Blake, a volunteer coordinator for 
one of the non-church orphanages, described the different motives behind the 
running of the Yangtze Orphanage, another case study. A Chinese man established 
the home, which currently cares for twenty-seven children. She related disturbing 
examples of his use of the children to fundraise from international donors, and the 
total lack of accountability and transparency regarding the use of such funds, 
which Harriet does not believe ever reach the children—she has since ended her 
                                                                                                                                        
concern also reported by directors in Johnson’s studies. Hu & Szente, supra note 85, at 13; 
JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 13; see also Holroyd, supra note 86, at 18 (discussing whether 
abandonment is more culturally acceptable in China where there exists “the social certainty 
that one’s kin are likely to feel morally obliged to take up this care”). Sister Qin of 
Guanghui Catholic Orphanage reported lower abandonment rates once she had put posters 
up requesting no more children be brought to Guanghui. The fate of children who may 
otherwise have been abandoned at Guanghui is, of course, unknown. Interview with Sister 
Qin, supra note 53. 
181 It is possible that a high level of activity is observable in certain provinces due to a 
correspondingly high Catholic or Protestant population. 
162 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8 
 
association with the orphanage.182 Examples of such corrupt private orphanages 
raise worrying questions about the potential abuse and neglect of children 
occurring in the sector. 
There are several reasons why children at private orphanages do not end 
up being cared for by the state welfare system. Many rural areas are prohibitively 
distant from the nearest state orphanage, most of which are in urban locations and 
theoretically only service urban populations. Children of prisoners are not eligible 
for care by welfare institutes. Shang notes that while “theoretically, the state is the 
sole welfare provider to vulnerable children in China,” at the same time state 
policy in rural areas is “not to take direct responsibility for supporting [vulnerable] 
children” where such children are theoretically cared for by “traditional family and 
kinship networks, and wubao [guaranteed food, clothing, fuel, healthcare, and 
education or funeral arrangements].”183 However, reality in rural areas does not 
always reflect the theory of central policies. Shang explains that, while many rural 
orphaned children are protected by wubao, there are deficiencies that render the 
system ineffective and inadequate as a means of care. First, in a community-based 
social system, children who are moved away from their birthplace tend not to 
benefit from the networks necessary for access, and are disentitled to wubao. 
Affected by this are abandoned children of unknown parentage and, thus, 
unknown identity and birthplace. Second, children cared for by their grandparents 
are similarly disentitled. Due to the widespread impoverishment and attendant 
vulnerability of the rural elderly as a social group,184 this lack of financial support 
for extended kinship networks caring for true orphans or abandoned children is 
problematic and contributes to the incidence of abandonment. Third, children of 
long-term prisoners are not entitled to wubao.185 Finally, Shang notes: 
 
[e]ven where the formal system is applicable, it may not work in 
poorer areas. Previous research suggests that the current system of 
child protection provided by the government has been placed 
under huge financial pressure during the economic reforms. The 
financial base of wubao has been weakened during the process of 
                                                      
182  Interview with Harriet Blake, volunteer coordinator, Chen Anhui orphanage, in 
Shanghai (Oct. 4, 2009). 
183 Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 126. 
184 Ce Shen & John Williamson, Does a Universal Non-Contributory Pension Scheme 
Make Sense for Rural China?, 22 J. OF COMP. SOCIAL WELFARE 143 (2006) (discussing 
the issue of welfare for the elderly); see also CHAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (noting that 
the rural elderly are expected to rely on either farming income or support from their 
children, in the absence of a compulsory retirement scheme). Such traditional modes of old 
age protection are proving difficult to maintain. 
185 Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 124. 
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de-collectivization and rural taxation reforms. The wubao system 
itself is becoming increasingly unreliable. Given the situation, 
even if children are entitled to social welfare benefits, they still 
may not be able to receive them owing to the financial difficulties 
facing local governments and communities.186 
 
For these reasons, kinship and wubao networks are unable to protect 
vulnerable rural children. Therefore, and in the absence of rural state institutions, 
grassroots private orphanages have evolved to address such inadequacies. 
Several sisters interviewed believe that, even when a state orphanage is 
within reach, some abandoning parents are reluctant to leave their children at such 
institutions out of fear of being caught and sanctioned for the crime of 
abandonment. Although, as noted above, punishment for the crime of 
abandonment is relatively rare, the fines potentially imposed in cases of 
prosecution are, at least anecdotally, high enough to deter many rural would-be 
abandoning parents. In addition, there is a perception among abandoning parents 
that children surrendered into the state’s care will disappear into the system. In 
contrast, by leaving one’s child at a local church or private orphanage, it is often 
possible for parents to watch from afar—most orphanages could relate incidences 
of parents who had a change of heart and came back for their child. Other 
abandoning parents will make a habit of leaving donations at the orphanage gates, 
even though they may be unwilling or unable to visit their children overtly. 
My interviews with the case-study private orphanages included an analysis 
of the implications of the lack of state registration and formal oversight as they 
relate to the inadequacy of welfare protection for orphans. One of the case study 
homes, Rainbow House, after years of operating quasi-legally and without 
registration, was able to obtain MCA approval for its operations, and Star Village 
is registered as a commercial entity. The remaining homes all continue to operate 
unregistered. Shang’s study of Guanghui and other grassroots Catholic orphanages 
also explored some of the implications of the lack of state registration, and her 
findings mirror those of this study. First, private orphanages generally are unable 
to obtain registration or legal standing, which means that, in addition to causing 
difficulties with banking, leasing and other operational matters, the children in 
their care often do not have a hukou. Without a hukou, one does not have legal 
status and, therefore, cannot access many basic rights of citizenship, such as state 
welfare (including wubao) or medical care. Government initiatives directed at 
orphans, such as The Tomorrow Plan,187 have no way of reaching children with no 
                                                      
186 Id. at 128. 
187 Id. 
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legal identity. Such children are also not able to be listed for international adoption 
with the China Center of Adoption Affairs. Although domestic adoptions for 
unregistered children have on occasion been arranged when a willing family has 
been located by the private orphanage itself, such arrangements are informal and 
not subject to state supervision, giving rise to the potential for misuse, and do not 
address the other problems stemming from a lack of hukou.  A hukou is also in 
theory required to attend schools, although some interviewees reported that they 
were able, in relation to at least primary school-aged children, to negotiate their 
admission to local schools based on good relationships (guanxi) with local 
teachers. The problem of unregistered children is not an unfamiliar one in China: 
“In 1988 the Public Security Bureau estimated that there were approximately one 
million [such] children.”188 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has also 
expressed concern about the lack of registration of unknown numbers of Chinese 
children.189 The lack of redress for non-registered children who are residents of 
unregistered orphanages results in a further stratification of orphans, analogous to 
the stratification of disabled persons discussed above, with hukou-less orphans 
subject to adoption, schooling, and medical care outcomes that are less favorable 
than those of registered orphans. 
Second, orphanages housing unregistered children are not eligible for 
government fiscal assistance or other benefits. All Chinese private homes 
interviewed were frustrated by their inability to obtain official not-for-profit status, 
since most believed that having legal recognition as a child-related welfare 
institute would entitle them to government funding, or at least bolster the 
legitimacy of their repeated appeals to various departments for assistance. Further, 
as non-registered entities, the private orphanages are legally prohibited from 
publicly soliciting donations,190 and are unable to issue official receipts (fapiao) to 
donors for tax deductions. On a related note, Ashley and He argue that a lack of 
registration as an NGO impacts on the ability of grassroots charities to fundraise 
internationally, because “foreign foundations often require that the programs to 
which they distribute funds be recognized as nonprofit organizations under their 
home country’s domestic laws.” 191  The situation means that local private 
orphanages must rely almost entirely on petty cash donations from the local 
community (which is inevitably very poor due to the mostly rural locations of 
                                                      
188 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 8. 
189 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39, arts. 42, 52, 53(d), 63. 
190 Gongyi Shiye Juanzeng Fa (
E K6YF) [Law on Donations for 
Public Welfare], arts. 10-11 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
June 28, 1999, effective Sept. 1, 1999) 1999 China Law LEXIS 1129. 
191 Jillian Ashley & Pengyu He, Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal and 
Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” NGOs in China Today, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 
62 (2008). 
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these orphanages), and are unable to solicit corporate sponsorship directly. 
Moreover, lacking an official, not-for-profit status hinders their ability to solicit 
domestic donations because, in China, the social legitimacy of NGOs is partly a 
function of proximity to, and recognition by, the state.192  
Third, as non-entities that operate outside the state system, private 
orphanages are not subject to the regulation and standardization of orphan 
services, nor are they provided with technical or policy support (other than by 
volunteers and NGOs). Safeguards against substandard provision of care for 
orphans are ineffective for unregistered grassroots orphanages, which operate 
outside of the formal legal framework for NGOs generally and child welfare 
institutions specifically. Accordingly, formal supervision of internal governance, 
financial management and care practices is lacking. Ashley and He make the same 
point about Chinese NGOs generally: “[the government’s approach to regulation] 
creates a supervision gap that could lead to messy accounting and internal 
governance, further undermining both governmental and public trust in these 
organizations.”193 This supervision and policy gap was not a concern raised by any 
of the Chinese interviewees, except on occasion in relation to access to training, or 
in relation to other organizations. All in all, the Chinese orphanage operators 
seemed to regard self-regulation as optimal, and regulation as superfluous, given 
the perceived inscrutable motives of those involved in the sector. Of course, the 
presumption that those who are willing to take on the burdens and difficulties with 
establishing such homes are necessarily acting out of benevolence rather than self-
interest is, anecdotally, fallible. Further, given the lack of expertise of even the 
most benevolent orphanage operators, on the one hand, and the unknown fate of 
children were such orphanages not in operation, on the other, it is difficult, with 
regards to much of the work taking place in the field, to know whether to 
characterize it as helpful or harmful. Nonetheless, most interviewees expressed 
                                                      
192 While, in China, NGOs are socially legitimized by their proximity to the state, Western 
NGOs are legitimized by their independence from the state. Junkui Han, International 
NGOs in China: Current Situation, Impacts and Response of the Chinese Government, in 
NGOS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 23, 33 (Yuwen Li ed., 2011). This feature of Chinese civil 
society makes more sense when one considers that “[h]istorically, Chinese civil society 
organizations were very different from those in the West in that they never served as a 
check and balance to political power.” Jia Xijin, The Development and Institutional 
Environment of Non-Governmental Think Tanks in China, in NGOS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 
53, 58 (Yuwen Li ed. 2011). 
193 Ashley & He, supra note 191, at 86. 
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concerns that increasing regulation of the industry would impinge on the scope of 
their work, it being “easier to do things if nobody knows you’re doing them.”194  
B. Foreign-run Foster Homes 
The co-existence of state and private homes for orphans comes into 
sharper focus as the study turns now to the orphan services provided by foreign 
workers in China. After the PRC was founded, all foreign-run missionary 
orphanages across China were either closed or taken over as state orphanages.195 
Today, many foreigners have embraced a new, collaborative model of orphan care 
in response to personal callings to assist the Chinese government and society in 
their care of vulnerable children. The foster home model, first pioneered in the 
1990s by the founders of Prince of Peace, has spread through major municipalities 
and their surrounding townships in the past decade. Under this model, government 
orphanages make arrangements to move children to more institutional-type foster 
homes, most of which are run by foreigners. The term “foster home” is used herein 
to describe organizations that provide family-style care to orphans who were 
previously residents of state orphanages on a temporary or long-term basis. The 
children are provided with medical intervention and rehabilitation, and then reside 
at the foster home, or with local foster families under the foster home’s 
supervision, until an adoption can be arranged through the central authorities. If an 
adoption match is not made, children often end up being cared for by the foster 
home on a permanent basis. As a result, a pressing issue faced by many of the 
homes is how to avoid becoming a hospice or an elderly home as their 
unadoptable children enter early adulthood. Such homes, almost exclusively 
located in urban areas, range from small-scale operations in which a small number 
of children are cared for by a “mother” and “father,” to large, institution-based 
foster care services provided for hundreds of children, with high caregiver to child 
ratios and an emphasis on emulating a family environment. Many homes have 
expertise in providing care for a particular condition or type of surgery. 
While Chinese grassroots orphanages have received some attention in 
sociological studies, this is the first study to include an in-depth overview of 
foreign foster homes’ growth, development, and scope of operations. Two 
previous studies have touched upon the role of foreign NGOs in caring for 
orphaned and abandoned children, and provide important contextual information 
and ethnographic insights into the social sphere of the foreign foster homes. 
Catherine Keyser’s overview of state and non-state actors that care for Chinese 
                                                      
194 Interview with co-managers of Good Shepherd Orphanage, a Catholic grassroots 
orphanage, in Beijing (Jul. 25, 2010). 
195 Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 205. 
2013]  CHINA’S ORPHAN WELFARE SYSTEM  167 
 
 
orphans introduces three high-profile foreign NGOs working closely with the 
MCA and state orphanages. Two of these are included in the current study. Keyser 
also references the lower-profile, unregistered foreign organizations providing 
foster care directly, which constitute the bulk of foreign charity organizations 
working with children in China.196 Her work touches on the difficulties faced by 
lower-profile foster homes due to their lack of registration, and the ongoing 
political tension over how such foreign NGOs should be registered and monitored. 
Leslie Wang’s doctoral thesis, The Global Politics of Orphanage Care in 
China, is a comprehensive analysis of the treatment of children in the state 
orphanage system, and focuses on the process of “transnational negotiation” that 
occurs where foreigners seek to collaborate with state orphanages, including 
through in-house services and foster home arrangements. Wang argues that 
partnerships between foreigners and state orphanages are “taking place on 
constantly shifting political terrain and often move forward with unchecked 
momentum or run up against unforeseen difficulties and collapse altogether,” 
rendering them highly unstable, and leading Wang to question the limits of such 
transnational collaboration as China continues to globalize. 197  This “shifting 
political terrain” is referred to also by Keyser, who argues that “political, 
bureaucratic, and financial constraints hamper the legalization of both 
[international] NGOs and domestic NGOs as full players in welfare provision for 
orphans,” the political constraint being “tension over how, and under what 
circumstances, [international NGOs] can be registered.”198 Keyser also points out 
that, while the ambiguous legality of foreign NGOs causes difficulties, “the very 
vagueness in the law on the protection of children as well as the ability to operate 
at the local level has also created opportunities,”199 apparently avoiding a law-
centric presumption that an ambiguous regulatory environment is inherently 
problematic or unstable.  
While foreign foster homes are less prolific than private orphanages, they 
are generally located in or near major municipalities, either in rented urban 
apartment complexes or more expansive properties in satellite villages and towns. 
Further, the histories of many of the homes are intertwined, with managers and 
staff commonly leaving one home to establish a foster home targeting a different 
and particular group of special needs children, which adds to the informal network 
of foreigners involved in orphan care in China and, especially, in the Beijing area. 
As a result, most home managers were contacted through introductions arranged 
by other foster homes, and it was possible to access more foster home case studies 
                                                      
196 Keyser, supra note 165, at 55. 
197 Wang, supra note 84, at 210. 
198 Keyser, supra note 165, at 62. 
199 Id. 
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than Chinese private orphanage case studies. In-depth and follow-up interviews 
were conducted at sixteen foster homes during the summers of 2009 and 2010. I 
spent up to several weeks living at a Dongjian* housing compound (where three 
homes are currently located and two more had their origins), and three of the foster 
homes—Good News, New Grace, and Red Thread. I contacted the majority of the 
foster homes in Beijing, Xi’an and Shanghai, and almost all agreed to be 
interviewed. However, given the lack of reliable data on the numbers of foreign 
foster homes in China, it is difficult to be more definitive on this point. Two 
Chinese homes were included in the study, both of which opened in the past three 
years, the founders of which are aware of other Chinese friends in the planning 
stages of copying the foster home model.  
Of the sixteen foster homes interviewed, about half have investigated 
becoming registered as charities; two have succeeded in obtaining an official, 
formalized partnership with the central MCA after many years of operating quasi-
legally; similarly, two have obtained unofficial recognition of their work through 
generalized contracts with nearby state-run orphanages. The remaining homes 
either are not legal entities, or have registered as commercial entities. 200 
Accordingly, these homes care for children who officially remain under the 
guardianship of state orphanages, which means they have extensive interactions 
with these government institutions. 
When striking up a relationship of trust with state orphanages, the foster 
homes follow a predictable pattern, which usually begins with a personal contact 
at a state orphanage or after a foreigner has volunteered at the orphanage for some 
time. As trust is built, often over many years, there may come a point where an 
individual feels confident enough to request to take one or more children home for 
prolonged, high quality, specialist medical treatment or care that the state 
orphanage is unable to provide. The state orphanage director must be convinced to 
release the child to the care of a foreigner and, in many cases, to allow the child to 
remain with the fosterer after treatment and until adoption. Over time, as trust 
develops and the foster home’s capacity is expanded, more and more children 
come to be residents of the private home. Small, short-term operations can expand 
to the point where, as in the largest of the case studies, several hundred children 
are being cared for outside of the state orphanage, which continues to receive 
government funding for those children. It is not just a matter of relocating children 
to a nearby facility under the close supervision of the state orphanage. Most foster 
homes are caring for children from distant provinces, with little to no ongoing 
interaction with the home orphanage. Children frequently are taken overseas for 
surgeries, often for months or years at a time, or may receive surgery in Shanghai, 
                                                      
200  Commercial registration is often more convenient than acting as a non-entity, 
particularly in relation to issuing visas, and at least provides a veneer of legitimacy to an 
organization by vesting it with legal personality. 
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Beijing, or the foster home itself. Given the extreme health issues experienced by 
most new arrivals, deaths are very common. 
Often, the foster home will require a contract to be signed, which 
stipulates that the child will not be called back to the state orphanage at any time. 
Alternatively, the state orphanage director may require a contract stipulating that 
all living and treatment costs will be borne by the foster home. The binding nature 
of these contracts is questionable, given that they are often signed in the name of 
an organization that has no legal identity. Regardless, due to the sensitivity toward 
foreign foster care, interviewees do not consider recourse to state dispute 
resolution procedures in the event of a disagreement to be a realistic avenue. 
The relationship with state orphanages largely depends on personal ties 
between directors and policy pressure on state orphanages, and is often unstable. 
In 2007, Tianjin Orphanage, which had children in the care of five of the 
interviewed organizations, abruptly and without warning, required all of those 
children to be returned to Tianjin. Reportedly, this was the result of a change in 
directorship, as well as a policy shift in Beijing towards improving institutional 
standards and away from Chinese and expatriate foster families. As Blue Sky Plan 
finances were distributed to state orphanages, directors with new but empty beds 
felt pressured to recall children who were residing with local foster families and 
foreign-run foster homes. This policy shift was more keenly felt by Tianjin 
Orphanage that by more rural orphanages, and Tianjin experienced more scrutiny 
than did more remote institutions because of the proliferation of foreign foster 
homes in the nearby Dongjian. Overall, the security of children who are residents 
of private foster homes is tenuous at best, and depends on the foster home 
maintaining rapport with the associated state orphanages: “The kids are not ours. 
At any moment, they can take the kids back, and they have done so in the past.”201  
The foster homes are careful to be, and to appear to be, uninvolved with 
adoption processes, although most aim to provide medical attention that allows a 
child to be moved from the special needs adoption register to the general adoption 
register, thus increasing their chances of placement. On occasion, some 
organizations will use personal contacts within the China Center of Adoption 
Affairs or a particularly foreigner-friendly state orphanage to match a difficult 
special needs case with a family willing to adopt that child; however, this special 
channel is used rarely to maintain its efficacy. 
The foster home interviewees varied in the level of concern they expressed 
about the difficulties of operating orphanages without formal recognition and/or 
legal status. About half have investigated the possibility of formal registration as a 
                                                      
201 Interview with director of BICR, a Beijing-based foster home, in Beijing (Aug. 27, 
2009).  
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foreign NGO in China. Some interviewees, echoing many of the Chinese private 
orphanages, expressed concern that “legalization” and government oversight 
could, in fact, hinder their ability to carry out their work and choose their foster 
home’s direction. The practical issues raised by the foreign foster homes related, 
for the most part, to the impact of their lack of charitable or, in some cases, any, 
legal status in China. One interviewee also expressed concern about the lack of 
minimum care standards imposed on the activities of the foster homes. 
One disadvantage of operating as a non-entity is that operators must 
transact leases, banking transactions, and employment contracts in their personal 
capacity, rather than in the name of the foster home. This practice results in sub-
standard banking and employment practices, and exposes signatories to legal 
liability in relation to such contracts, a situation about which many interviewees 
expressed unease. Likewise, banking restrictions create obstacles for all of the 
foster homes interviewed. Those homes that operate as non-entities cannot open 
bank accounts in the foster home’s name, which means that they must use 
unrelated, personal bank accounts to receive donations. This can cause 
transparency issues for international donors. 
The foster homes that are registered commercially (usually as a 
Representative Office of an overseas parent company) can open accounts, but 
these are of limited utility because RO bank accounts can only receive funds 
transferred from the bank account of the RO parent company.202  Donations 
received domestically, or from a donor unable to donate to the jurisdiction of the 
parent company, must be channeled through a personal bank account, which raises 
the same issues as non-entities.203 Further, the amount that can be withdrawn from 
a personal bank account is limited to $50,000 per year,204 which is far below the 
annual operating costs of all interviewed foster homes.  
The lack of government funding is less important for foreign-run foster 
homes than it is for Chinese orphanages because operating costs largely are met by 
international donors. Of the interviewees, only two expressed a desire for 
government recognition as a means of securing financial support. Foreigners 
running orphanages in China usually set up charitable entities in their home 
jurisdictions to facilitate international donations and enhance their legitimacy in 
the eyes of donors. This option generally is not feasible for Chinese-run 
orphanages because of the expense and their geographical and technical isolation. 
Aside from the difficulty of channeling such donations into China, fundraising 
restrictions preclude attempts to increase the proportion of domestic donations. All 
                                                      
202 Interview with Alain & Brigitte, supra note 119; Interview with David Dale, supra note 
170; Interview with Will Peters, supra note 47. 
203 Interview with David Dale, supra note 170. 
204 Interview with Will Peters, supra note 47; Interview with Andrew Muller, legal advisor, 
Wish Project, a Beijing-based NGO, in Beijing (Aug. 25, 2009). 
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the foster homes interviewed, whether unregistered, commercially registered, or 
NGO-registered, face severe limitations in their fundraising efforts because of 
restrictions on the issuance of tax-deductible receipts. Many interviewees 
speculated that they have probably missed out on significant sources of funding 
from local corporations interested in their work, due to the inability to provide an 
official fapiao.205 Will Peters states, “The government is creating a monopoly on 
charitable organizations,” 206  referring to the China Charity Federation. Tax 
deductibility is governed by the 1999 Public Welfare Donations Law,207 which 
provides that companies or individuals who donate to NGOs in accordance with 
the Donations Law will enjoy preferential tax treatment. 208  However, such 
preferential treatment is only granted if the State Administration of Taxation 
approves the NGO in question as a tax-deductible donee. Currently, only the 
China Charity Federation and a select group of related government-organized 
NGOs209 can issue tax-deductible fapiao for charitable donations.210 Accordingly, 
other NGOs, whether registered or not, must partner with a GONGO if a donor 
requires a tax deduction. Many NGOs avoid such a partnership because of the 
large “administration fees,” usually between ten and twelve percent, charged by 
most GONGOs for this service. It can also be difficult for an unregistered charity 
to find a GONGO willing to provide administrative banking support. 
                                                      
205 Interview with Eleanor Anders, Beijing International China Relief (foster home), in 
Beijing Aug. 27, 2009); Interview with Michael Victor, Prince of Peace Children’s 
Village, in Beijing municipality (Sept.1, 2009); Interview with Co-Founders/Directors, 
Loving Embrace Foundation, in Shanghai (Sept. 24, 2009); Interview with Harriet Blake, 
supra note 182. 
206 Interview with Will Peters, supra note 47. 
207 Note that a draft Charity Law, which would address the issue of tax deductibility of 
donations to NGOs, was circulated for comment in 2006 and is reportedly in the final 
stages of approval, anticipated to be promulgated sometime in 2012. Interview with MCA 
China Charity and Donation Information Centre, no. 39 (Sept. 8, 2009 [by email]). 
208 Gongyi Shiye Juanzeng Fa (
E K6YF) [Law on Donations for 
Public Welfare], arts. 24-25 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
June 28, 1999, effective Sept. 1, 1999) 1999 China Law LEXIS 1129. 
209 Government-organized NGOs, also known as top-down NGOs, are “citizen-led efforts 
from organizations that are nominally independent, but in fact are often established by and 
retain close ties with the state.” Ashley & He, supra note 191, at 32. GONGOs are 
commonly referred to as a type of NGO, but may not meet Salamon’s internationally 
accepted definition of an NGO, in particular the requirements of voluntariness and self-
government. Lester Salamon & Helmut Anheir, In Search of the Non-profit Sector. I: The 
Question of Definitions, 3 VOLUNTAS 125, 135 (1992). 
210 Interview with Director, Shandong Charity Federation, in Jinan (Sept. 21, 2009); see 
also Ashley & He, supra note 191, at 51. 
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As was the case for the Chinese-run private orphanages, because almost 
all of the foreign foster homes interviewed do not have legal status, they are not 
subject to formal supervision of internal governance, financial management, and 
care practices. Like the Chinese interviewees, this was not a concern raised by 
most of the foreign interviewees, who believe “[i]f the Chinese government just 
gets out of our way, that’s a big help.” Generally, the foreigners had greater 
administrative capabilities than did the Chinese interviewees, and all were able to 
explain detailed good governance practices aimed at fulfilling a self-imposed and 
self-regulated duty of accountability to donors and supporters. Many expressed 
concern that changing the status quo would impinge on the freedom they 
experience by operating outside of the legal framework. However, David Dale of 
New Grace was an exception: 
 
The danger is there’s no defined system or standard of care, even 
in the state orphanages. So you end up with everyone doing what 
everyone thinks is right or best. And you have to ask yourself – 
are we really caring for the children well enough? I think we are. 
But that’s just our judgment. That judgment should really be made 
by government, not us.211 
CONCLUSION 
We hope the government will one day see the needs of these 
children, and see that we also, with sincere good faith, are sharing 
the government’s responsibility. This is our country’s issue. We 
are willing to sacrifice, in the spirit of our country, sacrifice our 
hearts, to build up China. We are willing to act in concert with 
them. We hope that one day what we are doing will be recognized 
by government. We have been doing this work for twenty-two 
years, the first child we took in is now thirty years old. Their law 
says this—that orphanages are a governmental responsibility. But 
we are the ones implementing orphan protection.212 
 
This introduction to China’s orphan welfare sector shows the intersection 
of factors that impact potential outcomes for China’s vulnerable children. 
Abandonment, as in other countries, has a long history in China, and insufficient 
information is available on its current incidence, particularly in relation to disabled 
children and infants. Researchers agree that top-down policy changes are required 
                                                      
211 Interview with David Dale, supra note 170. 
212 Interview with Sister Qin, supra note 53. 
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to support parents in fulfilling their parental duties and expand the scope and 
supervision of NGOs in providing child welfare.213 However, it is apparent that 
bottom-up shifts in cultural discourse on child rights, disability, and adoption are 
both occurring and needed. Cultural norms influence notions of kinship, as well as 
formal and informal adoption patterns. This complex combination of norms and 
practices has created an equally complex web of state and non-state welfare 
providers, and insufficient attention has been paid to the possible influence of 
orphanages on cultural ideas about, and incidences of, abandonment.  
These contextual factors shape the role of non-state institutional actors, 
both Chinese and foreign, in caring for China’s “lonely children.” The government 
continues to maintain an ostensible monopoly on the institutional and short-term 
foster care of orphans, consistent with its objectives of maintaining tight control 
over civic organizations and religious-based and foreign-led activities. On the 
other hand, the inadequacy of state provision is demonstrable in two ways. First, a 
lack of rural facilities has resulted in an unknown number of de facto unregistered 
orphanages arising in areas inadequately served by state orphanages, many of 
which are run by the underground church and care for unregistered children on an 
ad hoc basis. Second, the standard of care provided in urban welfare institutions is 
considered by many, especially foreigners importing their own standards and 
expectations of child care, to be inadequate or open to improvement, and this 
attitude has led to the rise in the number of foreign foster homes caring for 
registered welfare recipients in an informal, undocumented, and unrecognized 
manner. Government policy on non-state orphanages is ambiguous, inconsistent, 
and opaque, but as long as state institutions are overwhelmed by their duty to care 
for China’s orphans, the non-state sector will grow organically in response to a 
demand for more accessible orphan care, and the gap between law and practice in 
the orphan welfare system, a gap so commonly observed in China, will endure.  
As private orphanages persevere, the cautious evolution of a sector in 
which multiple politically sensitive aspects intersect is an example of the transition 
from “welfare statism” to “welfare pluralism,”214 and the government’s increasing 
                                                      
213 See also UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39. 
214 Since the 1990s, the Chinese welfare system has been moving away from “a total state 
monopoly accompanied by a high degree of secrecy” towards “a somewhat more open, 
mixed system that, while dominated by the state, [seeks] support from a variety of private 
and charitable sources and encourage[s] greater local initiative and community 
involvement.” JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 188. This policy shift is known in China as a 
strategy of “social welfare socialization.” Shang describes the change as one from “welfare 
statism” to “welfare pluralism,” referring to increasing interaction between state, civil 
society and citizens in the policy process, and more openness on the part of government to 
(continued next page) 
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openness to allow non-state provision of services. Further, the spontaneous 
emergence of non-state actors to fill gaps in rural welfare provision is an important 
feature of the ongoing rural-urban divide that pervades modern Chinese welfare 
provision regimes. Beyond these implications for social policy research are 
broader social implications for outcomes of children who are residents of non-state 
institutions. 
Wang describes the drawing of a line of stratification among Chinese 
children in terms of their health and suzhi (quality); similarly, the emergence of 
non-state orphanages, in which children generally lack hukou, has created a line of 
stratification among orphans in terms of their access to basic citizenship rights. 
The orphans and foundlings who are cared for by urban state institutions 
increasingly are likely to be cared for by foreign foster homes, which results in 
access to higher adoption prospects and standard of living in the interim, and 
compounds the rural-urban stratification among vulnerable children. 
Madam Leng, the director and founder of Star Village, gives a monthly 
lecture to all the children in the care of Star Village’s many homes around China 
entitled “lü zai hefang?” (where is the road that should be taken?). The children of 
Star Village are raised by loving caregivers, and are taught to hope for a better 
future and take steps to achieve independence and a fulfilling life. But the 
question, “Where is the way?,” is asked by many observers about unregulated 
Chinese private orphanages: is the current approach to law, policy, order, and 
governance satisfactory? It is difficult to assess the impact on China’s orphans, or 
the lack thereof, from regulation of the private orphan welfare sector. Adoption 
prospects and care standards are increased for those residing in foster homes or 
benefiting from collaborative projects with state institutions, which means many of 
the foster homes are saving and transforming significant numbers of lives by 
providing care that state orphanages may not be able to provide. 
On the other hand, momentum in political or social advocacy for 
improved orphanage conditions by foreign workers is nonexistent due to the risk 
such advocacy would bring to their personal work in China. The sector’s growth is 
soft and slow; relationships between foster homes and both government and state 
orphanages are built gradually and tentatively by players astute and sensitive to the 
different and often conflicting considerations at play. In some grassroots Chinese-
run private orphanages the quality of care is high, although in many cases, 
economic backwardness is evident, children suffer the effects of the foster home 
lacking a legal status, and standards of care are set internally, with grave concerns 
expressed by observers about care practices. While increased regulation and 
oversight of the sector, done in a formal and standardized way, might not lead to 
                                                                                                                                        
facilitating civic/private financial support of welfare programs and initiatives. Shang, 
Better Way supra note 11, at 204. 
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improved orphanage conditions (indeed, whether taking responsibility for the 
supervision and registration of the homes is a viable option politically or 
economically is questionable), Shang’s calls for increased regulation of the sector 
are understandable given the Chinese government’s claims about its responsibility 
for orphans, and given the nexus between birth planning policies, abandonment, 
and human rights obligations.215 
Arguably, the Chinese government has a duty to allow private orphanages 
and foster homes to openly and freely engage in the welfare sector in order to 
improve the quality of life for Chinese abandoned children. However, due to a lack 
of formal oversight, this is not being done in a standardized or supervised manner. 
By keeping laws and policies that restrict orphanage operations to state actors 
while allowing unofficial policy to flourish as long as informal norms are 
followed, the government can maintain the fiction that only China cares for 
Chinese children and allow private organizations to assist overwhelmed local 
governments in orphan welfare. Further, such private charities can be unofficially 
but closely monitored, tightly controlled, and do not cause embarrassment by 
drawing attention to the disparity because they are aware of the shadow of state 
power and formal law. The lawyer for Shooting Star states, “The government 
wants to have its cake and eat it too—it wants to let NGOs function in China, 
without legitimizing them, but while keeping control over them. They are walking 
a tight-rope.” Given the symbolic function of laws that restrict the care of orphans 
to Chinese institutions, an ideology reflective of cultural pride regarding foreign 
charity in China, the law/practice gap may be a means to maintain the fiction that 
“China looks after its own children” while allowing beneficent foreigners to 
quietly help China’s orphanages provide better care for its children. Regulation of 
the sector, or reversion to formal laws and policies, could draw attention to the 
discrepancy between fact and fiction, a fiction in which much political and cultural 
pride seems to be invested, and result in more restrictions on foreign foster homes 
than are currently imposed. While there is flexibility associated with the current 
mode of governance and back turning, of which many workers are adept at taking 
advantage, this is not a satisfactory way to encourage growth in the charity sector 
or achieve better care outcomes for children. The personal moral codes of many 
individuals are sustaining them in their work, but are not always an adequate 
safeguard against abuse and death within the homes, especially given the lack of 
training and finances. For example, in Yangtze Orphanage, the slogan “it’s for 
orphans” is being used for self-serving purposes to the disadvantage of resident 
children.  
                                                      
215 Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 136. 
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Generally, the plight of orphans and vulnerable children in China has 
received increased attention in recent years, largely due to Hu Jintao’s “blue sky” 
call and associated MCA activity. However, many workers remain convinced that 
a general apathy towards orphans persists in Chinese society, which relates to the 
conception of rights contingent on one’s instrumental value to society rather than 
rights contingent on one’s intrinsic worth as an individual. The traditional focus on 
duties over rights, and society over the individual, remains evident in the treatment 
of orphans and the policies and practices governing the institutions that care for 
these children. Madam Leng’s question, therefore, seems pertinent: Where is the 
way forward? There is a pressing need to address the question of how the state, 
private orphanages and foster homes can co-exist in a mutually beneficial 
relationship, given how high the stakes are for China’s orphans. 
